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NAZI CONCENTRATION CAMP GUARD SERVICE EQUALS
"GOOD MORAL CHARACTER"?: UNITED STATES V. LINDERT
By K Lesli Ligorner
Fetching the newspaper from your porch, you look up and wave at your
elderly neighbor across the street. This quiet man emigrated to the United States
from Europe in the 1950s. Upon scanning the newspaper, you discover his picture
on the front page and a story revealing that he guarded a notorious Nazi concen-
tration camp. How would you react if you knew that this neighbor became a natu-
ralized citizen in 1962 and that naturalization requires "good moral character"?
The systematic persecution and destruction of innocent peoples from 1933 until
1945 remains a dark chapter in the annals of twentieth century history. Though the
War Crimes Trials at Nilnberg' occurred over fifty years ago, the search for those
who participated in Nazi-sponsored persecution has not ended. Prosecutors around
the world continue to investigate the perpetrators of those atrocities.
The Department of Justice Office of Special Investigations ("OSI"), 2 charged
with seeking the Nazi-sponsored persecutors who immigrated to the United
States,3 recently sought the denaturalization of former Nazi concentration camp
guard George Lindert.4 Lindert, a Youngstown, Ohio resident, entered the United
States in 19545 and obtained United States citizenship in 1962. Decades later,
.© K. Lesli Ligomer. J.D. candidate 1997, Washington College of Law, American Uni-
versity; B.A. Honours 1991, McGill University. My appreciation and sincere gratitude go to
everyone who made this Note possible.
1. Narnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69 (IMT 1946). This Note uses the traditional German
spelling of the city; several of the articles cited herein, however, use the English spelling
"Nuremberg." See, e.g., JANIS, infra note 28; WILLIS, infra note 20; Fogelson, infra note 29.
2. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
3. Transfer of Functions of the Special Litigation Unit Within the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service of the Department of Justice to the Criminal Division of the Department of
Justice, Att'y Gen. Order No. 851-79 (1979).
4. United States v. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. 1114 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
5. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1121. The United States Displaced Persons Commission
("DPC") rejected Lindert's application in 1951 because he served in the "Waffen SS
("armed SS"), then automatically considered a "movement hostile to the United States or its
form of government." Displaced Persons Act of 1948 § 10, 62 Stat. 1013 [hereinafter DPA]
(codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1962); Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1121. See infra note 99.
6. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1122.
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however, the OSI recovered documents that identified Lindert as a Nazi concen-
tration camp guard.7 As a result, the OSI filed a three-count complaint in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio on July 7, 1992.8
In September 1995, however, the District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio declined to revoke Lindert's naturalized citizenship. 9 In so doing, the Lindert
court erred in its expressed "task of determining the contribution of a single indi-
vidual to the collective wrongdoing of a nation or group."' 0
Domestically, the Lindert court's decision represents a sharp division between
the jurisprudence of the Sixth Circuit and the other federal Courts of Appeals re-
garding alleged Nazi persecutors. The Lindert court effectively ruled that one's
former service as a concentration camp guard in one of the more notorious camps
does not establish his/her lack of "good moral character." This message affronts
every Nazi concentration camp survivor" and every individual who believes that
the commission of a crime against humanity should result in some form of sanc-
tion.
Internationally, the Lindert court's message reinforces the resolve of those in-
dividuals who seek to shut down prosecution units that target individuals who par-
ticipated in Nazi-sponsored persecution. If the United States, the nation most vigi-
lant against Nazi perpetrators, does not find former concentration camp guards
deserving of denaturalization, then foreign courts with less political resolve will be
discouraged to investigate and prosecute persons who engaged in Nazi-sponsored
persecution. The Lindert decision reaffirms the fifty-percent budget reduction of
the Canadian unit that investigates participants in persecution spearheaded by the
Nazi regime.12 It supports the British government's decision not to renew the
budget for its investigative unit, which ceased to operate in May 1995.13 It fortifies
7. See id. at 1120. The OSI discovered Lindert's past as a concentration camp guard
because his name appeared on the roster dated August 4, 1944, which the United States
military forces obtained when they liberated Mauthausen in May 1945. The roster is an at-
tachment of the "Cohen Report." Id. at 1121. See also United States v. Tittiung, 753 F.
Supp. 251, 253 (E.D. Wis. 1990) (indicating that OSI learned of Tittjung's name from an-
other roster included in the "Cohen Report").
8. Complaint, United States v. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. 1114 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (No.
4:92CV1365) [hereinafter Lindert Complaint]. See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1995) (instructing
and authorizing United States Attorneys to institute denaturalization proceedings where
good cause for such action arises).
9. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. 1114.
10. United States v. Schmidt, 923 F.2d 1253, 1258 (7th Cir. 1991). Note, however, that
Lindert does not employ this legal standard.
11. See Marcy Oster, Lindert, Camp Guard for SS, Retains American Citizenship,
Cleveland Jewish News reprinted in Community News Rep., Oct. 20, 1995, at 3 (arguing
that the Lindert decision offends the sensibilities of Mauthausen survivors and calling it per
se "irrational") (quoting Cliff Savren, Regional Director of the Anti-Defamation League).
12. Dan Fesperman, Nazi Criminals May Escape Into History, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, May 21, 1995, at 24A.
13. Id.
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the Australian government's decision three years ago to dismantle its special in-
vestigative unit.
14
This Note evaluates the recent decision of United States v. Lindert.5 Part I of
this Note outlines the Narnberg decision, presents the basis for jurisdiction to
prosecute perpetrators of Nazi-sponsored persecution globally and in the United
States, and explains the general mechanics of denaturalization and its application
to alleged participants in Nazi-sponsored persecution. Part II introduces the facts
of United States v. Lindert. Part III critiques the District Court's legal conclusions
that affirm Lindert's naturalization despite the prosecution's "thorough, diligent
and exhaustive effort.' 16 Part IV analyzes the government's decision not to appeal
and recommends that all United States courts apply international law and prece-
dent to cases involving participants in Nazi-sponsored persecution. This section
asserts that the United States, by means of its judiciary, must show the interna-
tional community this country's clear unwillingness to provide a safe haven for
individuals who have committed crimes against humanity at any time during their
lives.
I. BACKGROUND
A. BASIS FOR WAR CRmES TRus AND NORNBERG
Upon discovering the extent of the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime
from 1933 through 1945, the Allied countries promulgated the London Agreement
of August 8, 1945.'7 The London Agreement established the jurisdiction for the
prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals from the European Axis
powers and set forth the Charter of the International Military Tribunal ("the Char-
ter").' The Charter' 9 established binding law for the International Military Tribu-
nal ("the IM'F' or "the Tribunal") in the War Crimes Trials70 The Nalrberg Trial,
14. Id
15. 907 F. Supp. 1114 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
16. United States v. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. 1114, 1117 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
17. Agreement by the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional
Government of the French Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and North Ireland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis,
August 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter London Agreement], reprinted
in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Pub. No. 8484, 3 TREAms AND OTHER INTEINAToNAL
AGREEM ENs oF THE UNr=rD STATES OF Ah MCA 1776-1949, 1238-47 (1969) [hereinafter
TREATIES].
18. Id
19. 59 Stat. 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 284 (1945) [hereinafter Charter]. Although the Charter
exists within the London Agreement, its significance warrants a separate citation in this Note.
20. Narnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 78, 107 (IIT 1946). Article 6 of the Charter ulti-
mately defined three crimes with which the Allies charged the defendant Nazi war crimi-
nals:
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the result of the London Agreement, manifested the world's condemnation of the
unfathomable acts committed by Nazi Germany.2'
The Ntlrnberg Trial established crucial international precedent based on legal
and moral foundations. 22 The Charter targeted individuals and groups.23 It stripped
government agents of the immunity generally enjoyed by such officials, despite
(a) Crimes Against Peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of
aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances, or
participation in a Common Plan or Conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the
foregoing ... ;
(b) War Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall in-
clude, but are not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation for slave labor or for
any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-
treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of
public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devasta-
tion not justified by military necessity;
(c) Crimes Against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation,
and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during
the war, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in
violation of domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
Charter, supra note 19, at 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. at 288, reprinted in TREATIES, supra note 17,
at 1241-42.
Controversy existed regarding what law to use and what crimes to charge at a war
crimes trial. Letter from Henry L. Stimson to John J. McCloy accompanying Memorandum
on Aggressive War by Colonel William Chanler (Nov. 28/30, 1944), in BRADLEY F. SMITH,
THE AMERICAN ROAD TO NUREMBERG 68-74 (1982). The Americans wanted to include a
charge of "crimes against peace," which essentially translates into waging aggressive war, a
charge that never before existed. Id. C.f T. J. LAWRENCE, TBE PRINCIPLES OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 311 (7th ed. 1923) (distinguishing only between offensive and defensive
parties without mentioning aggression); JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERO 175-
76 (1982) (explaining Justice Jackson's belief that aggression qualified as an uncodified
war crime because it violated the Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 27, 1928, 6 F.R.D. at 107).
But see H. WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 368, 373-74 (8th ed. 1866)
(stating that, once a war commences, each warring party possesses "all the rights of war as
against each other" and no distinction exists between ajust or unjust war).
21. Nfirnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. at 69 (incorporating the Charter). Britain, the Soviet Un-
ion, France and the United States all participated in the trial pursuant to the London Agree-
ment. London Agreement, supra note 17. The Ntlrnberg Trial adjudicated the convictions
of twenty-three defendants, all high-ranking Nazi officials. See Niarnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. at
69 (naming the defendants).
22. See Report from Robert Jackson, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court,
to Harold S. Truman, President of the United States (Oct. 7, 1946), reprinted in ROBERT
JACKSON, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS 439 (DEP'T ST. PUBL'N 3080
1945) (asserting that "the Ntlrnberg trial may constitute the most important moral advance
to grow out of [the Second World] [W]ar"). Justice Jackson served as a prosecutor for the
United States in the Nalrnberg Trial. Narnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. at 74.
23. Charter, supra note 19, at 1548, 82 U.N.T.S. at 290.
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the fact that they acted pursuant to orders of their superiors.24 Their official posi-
tions within the Nazi organization sufficed to warrant punishment. z Additionally,
the Charter eliminated the defendants' ability to blame their superiors but provided
that adherence to superior orders might mitigate punishment? 6 In order to con-
demn the actions of and membership in certain inimical organizations, the Charter
permitted courts to try members of certain groups as members and to declare these
27groups criminal organizations.
The London Agreement's progeny bind the United States. Common law com-
prises the vast body of United States law, and United States courts incorporate in-
ternational law as a unique body of common law.28 International law should be
binding upon all American courts, 9 and some judges in the United States have un-
24. It at 1548, 82 U.N.T.S. at 288 (establishing that defendants' official governmental
positions did not immunize them from or mitigate punishment).
25. Id
26. Id.
27. Id at 1548, 82 U.N.T.S. at 290. Accord, NMrnberg Trial, 6 F.RD. at 143 (indicting
the SS Totenkopf(Death's Head) as part of the SS, a criminal organization created for, inter
alia, persecution, enslavement, and genocide).
The IMTs could declare certain groups criminal organizations but lacked authority to
pass judgment on individuals. U.N. WAR CRPIES CO,%M'N, LAW REPORTS OF TRALs OF
WVAR Ctmnu s 48 (1992) [hereinafter U.N. WAR CRmIS Co.zi'N] (characterizing this
power to adjudicate organizations as declaratory and inapplicable to individuals). Compe-
tent national and local courts had the responsibility to adjudicate individuals based on "the
'declaratory judgment' of the Nuremberg Tribunal." Id The "declaration of criminality"
established the criminal nature of a group and estopped a defendant from questioning this
determination. Id Thus, in the case of individual members, the "declaration of criminality"
created a rebuttable presumption of guilt, thereby shifting the burden of proof to the defen-
dant to prove a lack of individual guilt. Id For further discussion of the "tests" submitted
by the prosecution, see infra note 170.
28. See Filartiga v. Peffa-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that
United States law encompasses the law of nations and, therefore, an individual who com-
mitted state torture in another country could face action under the Alien Tort Statute);
MARK XV. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 99 (2d ed. 1993) (declaring
that international law derived from non-treaty sources assimilates into United States law as
"a special form of the common law itself').
29. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425-26 (1964), super-
seded by statute on other grounds; The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (Gray,
J.) (asserting that "international law [exists as] part of [United States] law," and thus the
courts "must ... ascertain and administer [international laws]...."); Siderman de Blake v.
Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that "the universal and fundamen-
tal rights of human beings identified by Nuremberg" descend from the universal, fundamen-
tal norms known asjus cogens); Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48
(5th Cir. 1979); H.R. REP. No. 95-1542, at 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
4707 (necessitating adoption and application of international law's "crime(s) against hu-
manity" maxim in United States domestic law); JANIS, supra note 28, at 99 (implying that
municipal courts should acknowledge the validity of international law), 247 (characterizing
Nalmberg's goal as establishing that public international rules of law should and do govern
19971
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ambiguously recognized this canon. 30 The IMTs established the international legal
precedent generally for war crimes cases 31 and specifically for cases involving
32Mauthausen Concentration Camp guards. Though the United States played a
leading role in the institution and mechanics of the Ntlrnberg Trials,3 3 the Northern
District of Ohio failed to incorporate the principled Nurnberg doctrine into United
States v. Lindert.
34
B. JURISDICTION IN THE UNITED STATES TO PROSECUTE PERSONS WHO
PARTICIPATED IN NAZI-SPONSORED PERSECUTION
The Ntlrnberg principles provide the model for prosecution of Nazi-sponsored
individual action); see also U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., pt. 2, 55th plen. mtg. at 1144, U.N. Doc.
A1236 (1946) (unanimously affirming the "Ntlmberg principles" as "principles of interna-
tional law" and directing their codification).
Ajus cogens canon is one that the international community accepts without permitting any
deviation from it. Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d
929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23,
1969, art. 53, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, 8 I.L.M. 679). The Ninth Circuit finds ajus cogens
nonderogable and of "the highest status within international law" as exemplified by the
theories underlying the judgments of the Nflrnberg trials. Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at
715; JANis, supra note 28, at 65. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recog-
nized thatjus cogens norms bind all countries. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germ., 26 F.3d
1166, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (extensively detailing the application ofjus cogens norms in
domestic law). But see generally Steven Fogelson, Note, The Nuremberg Legacy: An Un-
fulfilled Promise, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 833, 833-49 (1990) (arguing that American courts
grant inadequate respect to the international law established in the Nuremberg Charter).
30. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 787, 799-800 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that
"crimes against humanity.. .violate international law") (citing M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNA-
TIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW & PRACTIcE ch. VIII, at ss. 2-80, 2-83 (1983)
and Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, Crimes Against Humanity and the Principle of Nonextradition
of Political Offenders, 62 MICH. L. REv. 832, 939 (1964) (citing Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, T.I.A.S. No.
1021, 78 U.N.T.S. 277)); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890 (applying international law as a body
of American law in a case involving a defendant who allegedly committed state torture in
another country).
31. See U.N. WAR CRMES COMM'N, supra note 27, at 49 (stating that "the judgment of
a Tribunal [IMT] which has not tried individual members has effect in the proceedings of
courts trying them").
32. United States v. Altfuldisch, No. 000-50-5, 3192, 3509-10 (DJAWC, Dachau 13
May 1946).
33. Exec. Order No. 9,547, 3 C.F.R. 378 (1943-1948) (appointing Supreme Court Jus-
tice Jackson to forge American efforts at developing a plan to prosecute the Axis criminals).
The French, the Soviets and subsequently the British all supported a trial on the condition
that the United States assume the burden of formulating an operable plan. Memorandum to
Judge Rosenman from Lord Simon (Lord Chancellor), reprinted in SMITH, supra note 20, at
149-52. For a detailed discussion on the history and policy behind the Nlrmberg Trial, see
Fogelson, supra note 29.
34. 907 F. Supp. 1114 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
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oppressors living in the United States. The Charter's provision for the charge of
"crimes against humanity" 35 supplied the basis for the rationale behind the United
States government's commitment to exclude these outlaws.36 Although the Ex Post
Facto provision of the United States Constitution precludes criminal prosecution
of such individuals,37 civil deportation and denaturalization proceedings38 embody
35. Supra note 20 and accompanying text (providing the definition of "crimes against
humanity").
36. 124 CONG. REc. 31,648 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1978) (statement of Rep. Fish) (noting
that the Immigration and Naturalization Act in force in 1978 did not require the exclusion
or deportation of persons who persecuted under the Nazi government's orders and finding it
necessary to do so as a "long overdue" statement of United States policy "to condemn such
conduct").
37. See D.C. BAR ASSOCIATION ET AL, GERtAN LAW IN TE 20TH CENTuRY: WEIMAR,
THE NAZI ERA, NUREMRG AND BEYOND pt. 6, § I, at 2-3 (Dec. 28, 1995) [hereinafter
GEIMAN LAW] (explaining that the United States government may not institute criminal
actions against alleged participants in Nazi-sponsored persecution because the United States
cannot constitutionally assert jurisdiction over crimes occurring outside its borders); see
also Jeffrey N. Mausner, Apprehending and Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals in the United
States, 15 NOVA L. REv. 747 (1991) (discussing the subject further); Eli M. Rosenbaum,
The Investigation and Prosecution of Suspected Nazi War Criminals: A Comparative
Overview, 21 PATtRNS OF PPEJUICE 17, 17-18 (1987) (explaining the inability to institute
criminal proceedings given the Ex Post Facto Clause in the United States Constitution).
Thus, persons who participated in Nazi persecution enjoy exemption in the United States
from all criminal proceedings against them based upon their persecutory conduct in Europe
during World War Il. GERMAN LAW, supra, at 3.
Other countries have chosen a different path to hold accountable those individuals who
participated in Nazi-sponsored persecution. Canada, for example, amended its Criminal
Code in September 1987 to permit present prosecution of residents implicated in war crimes
and crimes against humanity abroad, whether committed before or after the law's enact-
ment. Id, § II, at 1. See Regina v. Finta, 112 D.L.R. 4th 513 (Can. 1994) (charging the de-
fendant with violating Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as amended by R.S.C. 1985, c.
30 (3d Supp.), s. 1, the provision permitting the prosecution of Canadian residents charged
with crimes against humanity committed abroad). Interestingly, the law passed constitu-
tional muster against Ex Post Facto challenges by virtue of the Canadian Supreme Court's
decision in Finta. GERMAN LAW, supra, at 2.
Australia has also instituted criminal proceedings against alleged perpetrators of Nazi-
sponsored persecutory acts. Id. at 5. Upon allegations that people who participated in Nazi-
sponsored persecution had fled to Australia, the national government established a Special
Investigations Unit ("SIU") to handle the prosecutions. Under the War Crimes Act of 1945,
the SIU charged three alleged participants in Nazi-sponsored persecution with criminal
complicity. Id. at 5-6. All three prosecutions ended without success. IdM at 5. When the SIU
dissolved in June 1992, the government replaced it with the War Crimes Prosecution Sup-
port Unit, which dissolved in January 1994 after declining to initiate any new cases. Id. at 6.
Recognizing that participants in Nazi-sponsored persecution had entered Britain and still
lived there, the British government enacted the War Crimes Act in 1991 to confer jurisdic-
tion over "acts of murder and manslaughter, or culpable homicide" in Germany or German-
occupied territories between 1933 and 1945. Id at 7. In July 1995, the government insti-
tuted its first criminal case against the alleged former police chief in Mir, Belarus, Szymon
1997]
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the spirit of Nflmberg.
In 1979, the Attorney General established the Office of Special Investigations
(the "OSI"), which assumed responsibility for the civil enforcement of United
States immigration and citizenship laws against alleged participants in Nazi-
sponsored persecution. 39 The OSI enforces these laws40 against numerous persons
who, acting on behalf of or in association with the Third Reich or its allies, served
in organizations that persecuted civilians and prisoners of war.4t These acts consti-
tute crimes against humanity under Article 6(c) of the Charter. 42
Serafinowicz, for collaborating in the annihilation of Jews in 1941 and 1942. Id.; Fred Bar-
bash, Britain Launches Its First Nazi War-Crime Case, WASH. POST, July 14, 1995, at A24.
In Scotland, however, due to the unlikely prospects of collecting sufficient evidence against
potential suspects, the war crimes investigation team dissolved in 1994 after a three-year
existence. GERMAN LAW, supra, pt. 6, § II, at 7. The office in Scotland operated separately
from that in Britain. Id. For a discussion on the history of Canadian, Australian and British
Nazi war crimes prosecutions, see generally Rosenbaum, supra.
38. Denaturalization and deportation cases follow separate tracks and government at-
torneys may not combine the two actions. Due to the structure of denaturalization laws and
the liberty interest involved, the process takes a considerable amount of time. CHARLES
GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PRocEDuRE § 100.02[4][d][vi] (1995).
Federal prosecutors institute denaturalization cases in district court. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a)
(1994). Either party may appeal the verdict to the Court of Appeals and subsequently to the
Supreme Court, which might grant certiorari. GORDON ET AL., supra, § 81.05[2][1]. A de-
portation case commences with an administrative hearing before an immigration judge. Id.
§ 1.03[6][c]. The alien may appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). 8 C.F.R.
§ 242.21 (1996). Either party may appeal the BIA's decision to the Court of Appeals and
ultimately to the Supreme Court. Id.
39. See Att'y Gen. Order No. 851-79 (1979) (forming the Office of Special Investiga-
tions (the "OSI")). The Order vested the OSI with the exclusive mission of investigating
individuals who, prior to and during the Second World War, contributed to the Nazis' per-
secution of others "because of race, religion, national origin or political opinion." Id. After
identifying and investigating United States residents who once participated in Nazi-
sponsored persecution, the OSI then institutes denaturalization and deportation proceedings
against such individuals. Id.; GERMAN LAW, supra note 37, pt. 6, § 1, at 3. The OSI also
facilitates the extradition of Nazi criminals to stand criminal proceedings in other countries.
Id.
40. The OSI principally enforces three statutes: (1) 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1995), revok-
ing naturalization based on concealment of a material fact or willful misrepresentation; (2) 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E) (1995), excluding participants in the Nazi persecution; and (3) 8
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(D) (1995), deporting aliens who engaged in genocide or assisted in
Nazi persecution. GERMAN LAW, supra note 37, pt. 6, § 1, at 5.
41. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (explaining the OSI's jurisdiction and
responsibilities); see generally ALLAN A. RYAN, JR., QUIET NEIGHBORS (1984) (outlining
the OSI's specific history and role in prosecuting perpetrators of Nazi-sponsored persecu-
tion).
42. See supra note 20 and text accompanying notes 36-37.
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C. THE ART OF DENATURALIZATION CASES
Successful denaturalization proceedings remove the benefit of citizenship from
unlawfully naturalized United States citizens! 3 Once denaturalized, the alien may
then face deportation proceedings." Thus, after successfully bringing denaturali-
zation proceedings against the naturalized American citizen, the OSI commences a
deportation case against that individual.
45
Grounds for denaturalization arise when a defect in the original naturalization
process surfaces.46 The basis for denaturalizing Nazi-sponsored criminals depends
primarily upon (1) the statute under which the individual entered the country,47
and (2) whether the immigrant possessed a legally valid visa upon first entering the
United States."
The OSI frequently brings actions based on the immigrant's (1) illegal pro-
curement of citizenship;49 (2) willful and material misrepresentations or conceal-
ments during the naturalization application process;O and/or (3) failure to possess
the requisite characteristic of good moral character.f Thus, a denaturalization case
may develop with charges that the individual illegally procured United States citi-
zenship by concealing or materially misrepresenting persecutory activities con-52
ducted during World War II. Moreover, the government might charge that this
43. GORDON ETAL., supra note 38, § 100.02[5].
44. Id
45. See discussion supra note 38 (clarifying the process of denaturalization and depor-
tation).
46. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 506 (1981).
47. See, e.g., id at 514-15 (declaring that failure to fulfill a statutory condition at the
time of the petition for naturalization renders the procurement illegal); United States v.
Breyer, 41 F.3d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp.
1362, 1382 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (same), aff'd, 680 F.2d 32 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
48. United States v. Leprich, 666 F. Supp. 967, 968 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (recognizing
that an invalid immigrant visa renders subsequent naturalization as illegally procured).
49. See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1995) (authorizing the revocation of naturalization where the
alien attained citizenship illegally).
50. See id (authorizing the revocation of naturalization based on concealment of a ma-
terial fact or willful misrepresentation); Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 101(f)(6),
340(a) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ l101(f)(6), 1451(a) (1994)) (mandating the
revocation of citizenship if the court finds that the defendant gave false testimony in apply-
ing for immigration benefits).
51. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3) (1995) (requiring the applicant to be "of good moral
character, attach[ed] to the principles of the Constitution, and favorable disposition to the
United States").
52. Miscommunication about war atrocities generally constitutes a material misrepre-
sentation. Compare United States v. Dercacz, 530 F. Supp. 1348, 1351-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(finding that Dercacz materially misrepresented his wartime activities on his naturalization
papers by reporting work as a dairy farmer instead of truthfully reporting his service as a
Ukrainian police officer who aided the Nazis in transferring and enslaving Jews) and
United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 426, 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that Linnas mate-
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individual's actions during the Second World War prove his/her lack of good
moral character and that he/she thus entered the country on an invalid immigrant
visa.
The Displaced Persons Act of 1948 ("DPA"), 53 the original statutory precedent
for OSI cases, incorporated a provision of the Constitution of the International Re-
lief Organization ("IRO") 54 forbidding the issuance of immigration visas to per-
sons who had "assisted the enemy in persecuting civil[ians]" or "voluntarily as-
sisted the enemy forces. 55 The provision also proscribed the granting of visas to
former members of "movements hostile to the United States." 5 The United States
government established "Inimical Lists, 57 for example, as a means of facilitating
rially misrepresented information by falsely claiming to be a university student from 1940-
1943, though he actually served as Chief of Tartu Concentration Camp), aff'd, 685 F.2d
427 (2d Cir. 1982) with United States v. Kungys, 571 F. Supp. 1104 (D.N.J. 1983)
(deeming a lie about one's birthplace an immaterial misrepresentation), rev'd, 793 F.2d 516
(3d Cir. 1986), rev'd & remanded, 485 U.S. 759, 775 (1988).
53. DPA of 1948, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009. With a swelling number of refugees in the
camps run by the United States Army in cooperation with the International Relief Organi-
zation, infra note 54, President Truman suggested the enactment of immigration legislation
that would permit the entry of 200,000 refugees. 7 FOREIGN REL. OF THE U.S. 644, 703
(1946); RYAN, supra note 41, at 15. This marked the birth of the DPA which Congress en-
acted two years later. Id. For a discussion of the reasons for the ease with which Nazi col-
laborators and war criminals entered the United States under the DPA, see RYAN, supra
note 41, at 16-28 and EFRAIM ZUROFF, OccutPATION: NA HUNTER: THE CONTINUING
SEARCH FOR THE PERPETRATORS OF THE HOLOCAUST 32-48 (1994). For a discussion of the
admitted impossibility of accurately identifying and denying visas to Nazi perpetrators at
the refugee camps, see Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Amendments to the Dis-
placed Persons Act, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess. 493
(1950), microformed on CIS No. 928 (Congressional Info. Serv.) (statement of Edward M.
Glazek) [hereinafter McCarran Hearings].
54. Compare DPA § 10, 62 Stat. 1013 (utilizing the language from the IRO's constitu-
tion), with Constitution of the International Relief Organization, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1946, annex I, pt. II, 62 Stat. 3038, 3051-52, T.I.A.S. No. 1846 (providing the language
for Section 10 of the DPA). In 1946, the United Nations formed the IRO as a "vehicle for
resettlement." Id. The IRO, a temporary specialized agency, established and managed a
network of camps to house the displaced and homeless until negotiations regarding their
resettlement provided a future. Id. The IRO Constitution required that each supporting na-
tion-the United States, Canada, Australia, and the free countries of western Europe-
admit a portion of the group of displaced persons for permanent residence. Id.; ROBERT A.
DIVINE, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1924-1952 112 (1957).
55. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 495 (1981).
56. Id.
57. Declaration of German Atrocities, reprinted in 9 DEP'T ST. BULL., Nov. 1943, at
3 10-11. The United States government issued rosters called "Inimical Lists" in order to en-
force Section 10 of the DPA. Id. The Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943, signed by
Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill, signified the first attempt to issue compilations of names of
war criminals and thus served as a predecessor to the "Inimical Lists." Id.
Although the government no longer uses "Inimical Lists," the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service currently utilizes "watchlists" that list individuals identified for exclusion.
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the identification of ineligible visa recipients, although inclusion in these lists is
not necessary to a "movements hostile" finding. Inimical Lists identified organiza-
tions, including the SS Death's Head Battalions,B whose purposes or activities
rendered their members inadmissible to the United States. The DPA, therefore,
mandated categorical visa ineligibility to, inter alia, individuals who participated
in any listed organizations. 9 Moreover, the OSI may denaturalize and subse-
quently deport any persons wrongly admitted into the United States, for lawful
naturalization requires lawful entry.6°
Upon the DPA's expiration in 1952, Congress enacted the Refugee Relief Act
("RRA").61 The RRA altered the DPA's standard, creating new immigration pos-
sibilities for participants in Nazi-sponsored persecution.6 Thus, some applicants
See GEnMAN LAW, supra note 37, pt. 6, § I, at 1 (mentioning the number of persons whom
OSI has placed on "watchlists").
58. Narnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 143 (IMT 1946) (naming the SS, including the
Death's Head, as a criminal organization); see discussion, supra Part I.A. "SS" stands for
the German word Schutzstaffel (protection squad), a Nazi organization formed to serve Hit-
ler. United States v. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. 1114, 1118 (N.D. Ohio 1995). Hitler accorded
the SS the responsibility of policing Nazi-occupied territories. Ia The SS always existed as
a branch of the Nazi Party. Record at 169, 594, United States v. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. 1114
(N.D. Ohio 1995) (No. 4:92CV1365) [hereinafter Lindert Record] (testimony of historian
Charles Sydnor, Jr.). By the outbreak of World War II, the SS grew into one of the largest
and most powerful institutions in the Third Reich and constituted the dynamic core of the
National Socialist State. Id at 172.
The SS always existed as a separate entity from the German army (Wehrmacht). lI at
179. Different commanders led the Wehrmacht, and they wore distinct uniforms. Id Those
who served in the Waffen (Armed) SS knew their services differed from those serving in the
Wehrmacht. Id at 185-86. See cases cited infra notes 267,282 (illustrating examples of de-
fendants who knew that service in the Waffen SS had different repercussions than did serv-
ice in other units).
59. The DPA also barred the admission of aliens from other Nazi organizations not
named on the Inimical Lists where those organizations assisted Axis enemy forces or par-
ticipated in persecution. United States v. Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d 488, 496 (3d Cir. 1985).
60. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1995) (directing United States Attorneys to institute proceed-
ings to revoke and set aside naturalization orders where immigrants "illegally procured
[such certificates] or ... procured [them] by concealment of a material fact or by willful
misrepresentation"). See, e.g., id., 571 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 773 F.2d 488 (3d Cir.
1985) (denaturalizing a member of the Ukrainian militia for concealing this fact); United
States v. Schellong, 547 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. I1. 1982), aft d, 717 F.2d 329 (7th Cir.), aJJ'd,
718 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1983) (denaturalizing a member of the Waffen SS for concealing or
misrepresenting this fact); United States v. Koziy, 540 F. Supp. 25, 33 n.15 (S.D. Fla. 1982)
(denaturalizing a former member of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists for misrep-
resenting and concealing this fact), aff'd, 728 F.2d 1314, 1317, 1321-22 (11 th Cir. 1984).
For a discussion of American knowledge that the DPA easily facilitated the immigration
of Nazi persecutors, see RYAN, supra note 41, at 12-28.
61. Pub. L. No. 751, 67 Stat. 401, as amended by Act of Aug. 31, 1954, 63 Stat. 1044
(expired Dec. 31, 1956) [hereinafter RRA].
62. Compare RRA § 14, supra note 61 (prohibiting entry to any alien who "personally
advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person or group of persons b-.cause of race,
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whose affiliations with the Nazi regime caused earlier rejections under the DPA
managed to enter the United States under the RRA.63
Upon realizing that the United States immigration statutes lacked a provision
specifically providing for the deportation of those individuals residing in the
United States who participated or assisted in Nazi-sponsored persecutory conduct,
Representative Elizabeth Holtzman inspired Congress to rectify the problem. Her
efforts resulted in the passage of the Holtzman Amendment in 1978.64 According
to Department of State officials, the Holtzman Amendment 65 mandates the depor-
tation of aliens who either served in Nazi units that carried out acts of persecution
or assisted or participated in such persecution,66 just as the DPA and RRA mandate
the exclusion of such persons.
religion or national origin," discontinuing the legal exclusion on former Nazis) (emphasis
added) with DPA § 10, supra note 53 and discussion in Part I.C (explicitly barring former
Nazi persecutors from obtaining immigration visas). To overcome the different burden of
proof, the OSI elicits testimony from State Department officials who issued visas under the
RRA and testify that they had the authority to deny visas based on the undesirability of the
applicant; this basis justified the exclusion of people who participated in Nazi-sponsored
persecution. See RYAN, supra note 41, at 248. Ryan explains that officials used Commu-
nism as the "litmus test" for eligibility instead of checking applicants' war records. Id. at
327. See also Petkiewytsch v. INS, 945 F.2d 871, 876 (6th Cir. 1991) (discussing the prob-
lem in the RRA and the response provided by the 1978 Holtzman Amendment, infra note
64).
63. See RYAN, supra note 41, at 327 (explaining the problem in the INA); United States
v. Schellong, 547 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Ill. 1982), afid, 717 F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1983)
(denaturalizing Schellong, who, after rejection under the DPA, entered the United States
under the RRA), aft'd, 718 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1983).
For criticism of the RRA based on its allegedly lower standard, see RYAN, supra note
41, at 327.
64. Holtzman Amendment of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-549, 92 Stat. 2065 (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(19)). Section 103 provides in pertinent part for the deportation of aliens
who aided Nazi government in Germany in any manner from 1933 until 1945. 8 U.S.C. §
I 182(a)(3)(E) (1995). The Amendment eliminated both the possibility of a former Nazi per-
secutor obtaining a visa and the authority of the Attorney General to admit him/her as a
temporary non-immigrant. Id. Additionally, the Attorney General may not block a deporta-
tion proceeding by issuing a waiver, though he/she may do so for non-Nazi applicants. Id.
65. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing operative provisions of the
DPA and RRA).
66. H.R. REP. No. 95-1542, at 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4702. E.g.,
Kulle v. INS, 825 F.2d 1188, 1192 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding that armed guard service at a
Nazi concentration camp per se constitutes assistance in persecution and therefore affirming
deportation of the defendant); Schellong v. INS, 805 F.2d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 1986) (same);
United States v. Tittjung, 753 F. Supp. 251, 257 (E.D. Wis. 1990) (same), aff'd, 948 F.2d
1292 (7th Cir. 1991); In re Blach, No. A10 629 292, at 24 (Immigr. Ct., Los Angeles, Apr.
27, 1987) (remarking that any concentration camp guard, "by virtue of his position," par-
ticipated in persecution), aftd, Nos. AIO 629 292 & A24 198 399 (B.I.A. Feb. 8, 1990); In
re Fedorenko, 19 I. & N. Dec. 57, 59 (B.I.A. 1984) (same).
[12:1
UNITED STATES V. LINDERT
II. UNITED STATES V. LINDERT
A. LINDERT'S PERSONAL HISTORY
George Lindert was born in Passbuch, Romania on January 3, 1923.67 In 1942,
the Waffen SS, the elite armed guard and intelligence unit of the Nazi Party of
Germany, recruited him into its ranks. 6 He received his SS training in Poland,69
where he learned to handle weapons and perform guard duty. 0
After Lindert completed training, the SS assigned him to Mauthausen Concen-
67. Lindert Complaint, supra note 8, at 2. But see United States v. Lindert, 907 F.
Supp. 1114, 1118 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (reporting Lindert's year of birth as 1922).
68. Id at 1119. Waffen SS members personally traveled to the villages of northern
Transylvania and recruited Lindert and his brother, among others. Lindert Record, supra
note 58, at 1069 (testimony of Lindert). Rather than forcefully recruit German men eligible
for the draft, id at 224 (testimony of Sydnor), Waffen SS members induced potential re-
cruits with financial incentives and marketed the advantages of service in the SS. Id at 249.
Before the Waffen SS could recruit from the ethnic German population in Hungary,
Germany needed permission from the Hungarian government. kd at 226-28. On January 14,
1942, the Hungarian government granted the Waffen SS qualified permission to recruit
20,000 volunteers; the Hungarians allowed recruitment only of "ethnic German volunteers"
between the ages of eighteen and thirty, and only where the individual volunteer presented
"a written declaration of [parental] agreement." Id at 228-233. All volunteers would re-
ceive German citizenship. Id
In sun, an ethnically German male living in Hungary in 1942 and physically qualified
for military service could choose among three options: he could (1) join the ,affen SS with
the written consent of his parents; (2) join the Hungarian Army with the written consent of
his parents, as the age of majority was twenty-four years of age; or (3) wait until the Hun-
garian Army drafted him in five years. Id at 233-34. No historical documentation provides
any evidence that the ethnic Germans from Transylvania faced threats of physical harm for
refusing to join the SS. Id at 251.
The Lindert court noted that the SS recruited Lindert over his parents' objections.
Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1119. The court presumably included this finding of "fact" to un-
derscore a theme of involuntariness, however, the Supreme Court deems involuntariness an
implausible defense. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 511 (1981) (noting that the
"deliberate' failure to include the word "voluntary" in § 2(a) of the Holtzman Amendment
disqualifies all who assisted in persecution from receiving immigrant visas under the RRA).
In Fedorenko, the United States Vice-Consul, a government witness, testified that he had
good reason to discount the possibility of any concentration camp guard's involuntary
service. Id at 499 n.14. He stated that guards regularly answered the question about their
reasons for beginning and continuing as guards by admitting their free, voluntary choice.
Id Further, as mentioned infra note 164, considerable evidence indicates that individuals
could avoid camp guard service by requesting a transfer.
69. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1119. The SS Troop Training Camp at Dabica, Poland,
where Lindert trained, was the main training center for reserve and replacement SS volun-
teers. Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 251-52 (testimony of Sydnor).
70. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1119.
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tration Camp, 71 where he served from approximately the late spring of 1942 until
the summer of 1943.72 As a guard at Mauthausen, Lindert always carried a loaded
rifle.73 Moreover, he wore the Death's Head uniform, which included a skull and
crossbones insignia on the collar;74 indeed, no other Waffen SS unit distinguished
itself with this insignia.7 Lindert's watchtower guard duties at Mauthausen re-
quired him to prevent the prisoners' escape and ensure that they did not approach
the barbed wire surrounding the entire camp.76 Lindert testified that he served in
the concentration camps only as a "perimeter guard, with an occasional opportu-
nity to escort non-prisoners past the quarry."
77
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1120; Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 1076-77, 1079, 1171 (testimony of
Lindert).
73. Lindert Deposition, Apr. 18, 1991, at 68, United States v. Lindert, 907 F. Supp.
1114 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (No. 4:92CV1365). In response to a deposition question, Lindert
admitted that he carried his weapon all the time while on duty. Id.
74. Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 180-82 (testimony of Sydnor). The government
admitted into evidence a photograph depicting Lindert in the Death's Head uniform with
the aforementioned markings indicating his rank of private at the time of the picture. Id. at
180-81. The customary skull and crossbones insignia distinguished Death's Head members.
See United States v. Leprich, 666 F. Supp. 967, 967 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (noting that
Leprich's Death's Head uniform at Mauthausen incorporated the skull-and-crossbones
symbol); United States v. Tittijung, 753 F. Supp. 251, 253 (E.D. Wis. 1990) (noting that
Tittjung, who also served at Mauthausen, wore the organization's symbol on his collar),
aff'd, 948 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Schmidt, 923 F.2d 1253, 1255 (7th
Cir. 1991) (mentioning that Schmidt wore the skull and crossbones of the Death's Head on
his SS uniform).
75. Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 180-82 (testimony of Sydnor).
76. Id. at 1183-86 (testimony of Lindert). See Lindert Deposition, Apr. 18, 1991, at 68-
69, Lindert (No. 4:92CV1365) (admitting that he "mostly work[ed] guarding the quarry").
The immigration judge further noted that a guard's sole purpose was to persecute targeted
individuals. Id. See also In re Blach, AIO 629 292, at 24 (lmmigr. Ct., Los Angeles, Apr.
27, 1987) (labeling concentration camp guards as mere "part and parcel of a criminal sys-
tem"), aff'd, (B.I.A. Feb. 8, 1990).
77. United States v. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. 1114, 1120 (N.D. Ohio 1995). Lindert con-
tradicted himself by testifying that he guarded outside terrain though no imminent threat of
attack existed:
Lindert: Well, we actually guarded just the outside terrain. We didn't actually have
nothing to do with prisoner at all. Actually, we didn't even-we weren't even---even
allowed to talk to the people.
OSI: But you were supposed to watch to make sure that they did not approach the
fence?
Lindert: Oh, they didn't approach.
OSI: And your duty was to make sure that they didn't approach the fence?
Lindert: Well, that's-well, yes.
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The Mauthausen "extermination camp," ' 8 designated by the SS as the harshest
of all camps, 79 served as a slave labor camp where enemies of the Reich faced
punishment.8a Both a crematorium and a gas chamber existed at Mauthausen.8 1 An
outer-perimeter fence, that surrounded the entire camp, 2 incorporated electrified
wires and guard towers from which the guards could see each other.8 A large
granite quarry existed inside the barbed wire.84 Guards led prisoners daily to the
quarry, forcing them to transport large boulders up one hundred eighty-six steps.
Lindert stated that he stood guard in the quarry's surrounding watchtowers, from
which he could see the prisoners and a part of the quarry floor e5
Lindert: No danger about this.
Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 1184 (testimony of Lindert). Arguably, Lindert's exis-
tence at Mauthausen aided a grander scheme. He admitted that he guarded the perimeter
fence and that no danger of attack existed. Hence, he must have known that his mere pres-
ence aided in the prisoners' persecution and that he carried a weapon solely to intimidate
and shoot at inmates.
78. United States v. Altfuldisch, No. 000-50-5 (Dachau 13 May 1946).
79. Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 141-42, 144 (testimony of Sydnor) (emphasis
added).
80. United States v. Leprich, 666 F. Supp. 967, 967 (E.D. Mich. 1937).
81. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1119; Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 144 (testimony of
Sydnor). A special chamber, an execution comer, was located next to the crematorium and
adjacent to the gas chamber. Id at 390-91. The guards placed prisoners against the wall and
shot them in the napes of their necks through an opening in the wall. Id
82. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1119.
83. Id
84. Id The quarry, Vienna Ditch, operated as an economic enterprise of the SS. Lindert
Record, supra note 58, at 278 (testimony of Sydnor). The government expressly designed
the quarry so that slave labor could extract stone for construction purposes. Id at 120. The
majority of Mauthausen prisoners worked in the quarry. Id. at 283. Guards patrolled the
quarry floor at all times, "[b]ut the most important aspect of the guard duty around the
quarry involved manning those towers [outside the wire fence surrounding the quarry] and
walking that perimeter fence." Id at 828-29.
85. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1119-20; Lindert Record, supra note 53, at 305, 812
(testimony of Sydnor). Guards forced prisoners to carry heavy stones up and down the stairs
as punishment or merely for the guards' enjoyment. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1119-20. From
the towers, the guards shot those prisoners physically unable to make the trip. Lindert Rec-
ord, supra note 58, at 305, 812 (testimony of Sydnor). Guards pushed prisoners or forced
them to jump over the cliff surrounding the quarry, a recreational activity know as the
"parachute jump" Id. at 339. Slayings of the prisoners occurred "again and again" - so of-
ten that people who lived in the neighboring countryside complained of the "inaccurately
shot" half-dead prisoners being left to die "next to the dead for hours or even days." Letter
of the Mauthausen Gendarmerie Post to the State Council in Perg re: Complaint by Eleon-
ore Gusenbauer pertaining to inhuman treatment of the concentration camp prisoners, 27
Sept. 1941, in AUSZUG AUS WIDERSTAD UND VERFOLUNG IN OBEROSTERREICH 1934-1945
(RESISTANCE AND PERSECUTION N UPPER AUSIA) (on file with the American University
Journal of International Law and Policy).
86. Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 1080, 1090, 1101, 1183 (testimony of Lindert).
Some of the posts in the watchtowers included vantage points from which a guard could see
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Mauthausen consisted of a main camp and many sub-camps.8 7 The main camp
included an enclosed protective custody camp, set off by a stone wall, where the
Germans housed the prisoners.88 Within the protective custody camp existed the
"Appelplatz" area, where the guards took roll calls every morning and evening.8 9
SS personnel administered brutalities during these mandatory roll calls and
counted the living bodies as well as the dead.9° The fact that the SS supervised roll
call makes it highly improbable that an SS guard never witnessed one.
In the late summer of 1943, the SS transferred him to the Loibl-Pass sub-camp
92
of Mauthausen. 93 Lindert's duties included guarding the outside of the tunnel, the
main work site at Loibl-Pass. 94 At Loibl-Pass, he witnessed the prisoner roll call
inside the camp every day.95
portions of the quarry and the steps leading down into the quarry. Id. at 1183. Guards
monitored the quarry only while prisoners worked. Id. at 1184-85.
87. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1119.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.; Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 284, 451 (testimony of Sydnor).
91. Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 452-53 (testimony of Sydnor).
92. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1120. Loibl-Pass, located in the Karawanken Mountain
Range that separated Austria from then-Yugoslavia (now Slovenia), id., was strategically
crucial to the Germans during the war because German forces occupied the Balkan penin-
sula. Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 418 (testimony of Sydnor). For this reason, the
Germans resumed construction of a tunnel through the mountain range during the summer
of 1943. Id. at 418-19. The Nazis used a substantial number of the Mauthausen prisoners
for this work. Id at 419-20; Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1120. The Third Reich contracted with
a private construction company for the project, and the contract explicitly called for the use
of slave labor and SS guards from Mauthausen. VERTRAG FOR DEN BAU DES LOIBLTUNNELS
(CONTRACT FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF TBE LOML TUNNEL) 1, 4, 45-51, 56-58 (31 Mar.
1944).
93. Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 1110, 1112, 1171 (testimony of Lindert).
94. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1120; Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 1193-94
(testimony of Lindert). The only wire and watchtowers at Loibl-Pass existed on the perime-
ters of the north and south protective custody camps. Id. at 1194, 1195; id. at 633-35
(testimony of Franc Vidmar, a Loibl-Pass survivor). Loibl-Pass's ratio of camp guards to
prisoners exceeded that of other camps. Id. at 433 (testimony of Sydnor). The higher ratio
existed because of the SS's inability to fence off a security zone at the tunnel construction
site. Id. In addition, the work details congregated prisoners in a larger single mass than in
other camps. Id. at 433-434. Regulations for SS who guarded concentration camps required
the ratio for outside work details to be at least one guard for every four prisoners. Di-
ENsTvORSCHRIFT FOR KONzENTRATIoNsLAGER (SERVICE REGULATIONS FOR CONCENTRATION
CAMPS) 27 (1941) (on file with American University Journal of International Law and
Policy). The regulations required escort guards for outside details to wear gray service uni-
forms, caps, carry a rifle or submachine gun, bayonet and live ammunition. Id. The regula-
tions also ordered guards to remain within six paces of a prisoner at all times, enabling them
to utilize their weapons "without hindrance." Id.
95. Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 1186-87 (testimony of Lindert). The court failed
to recognize that an Appelplatz existed at Loibl-Pass, citing only that of Mauthausen.
Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1119; Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 638 (testimony of Vidmar)
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Lindert surrendered to the British in 194596 and lived in various prisoner of war
camps until his release in 1947, when he returned to his family in Austria.9
7
B. LINDERT'S IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
In June 1951, Lindert completed a questionnaire93 and Military History State-
ment as part of his application for immigration to the United States under the
amended DPA. 9 Because his service in the Waffen SS qualified as participation in
a movement inimical to the United States, however, the Displaced Persons Com-
mission ("DPC") 00 rejected Lindert's application.10 1 In light of an alteration in the
criteria for admission under the DPA,1° the DPC interviewed Lindert on February
25, 1952 as part of a review process that began in December 1951 to redetermine
his eligibility. 10 3 Former SS Death's Head concentration camp guards, however,
According to one Loibl-Pass prisoner's testimony, beatings occurred during the roll calls at
Loibl-Pass. Id Guards sprayed some prisoners with cold water and made them stand in the
winter cold for extended periods of time. Id at 452 (testimony of Sydnor). Guards jumped
on prisoner's chests and stomped on their Adam's apples. Id In the winter as well as the
summer, roll calls sometimes exceeded two hours in length and sometimes included calis-
thenics as torture. Id
96. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1120. After the Germans surrendered, the British took
many of the Loibl-Pass SS guard personnel into custody. Lindert Record, supra note 58, at
458-59 (testimony of Sydnor). The Allies did not liberate Loibl-Pass. Rather, the camp
merely disintegrated, and the guard personnel simply disappeared from the vicinity of the
camp. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1121.
97. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1120. Lindert was one of thousands of German soldiers
detained in various prisoner of war camps in Italy. Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 1117,
1120, 1121, 1131-32 (testimony of Lindert). The British later transferred Lindert to a camp
in England for approximately one year. Id
98. Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 939 (testimony of David Jelinek, former Vice-
Consul in Salzburg, Austria). These questionnaires, written in German, provided United
States officials with rudimentary information to determine each applicant's eligibility for a
visa and admissibility to the United States. Id. The Consular official would then corroborate
the applicant's data with documentation provided by the applicant. kd at 952-53. In com-
pleting this questionnaire, Lindert concealed his service in the Totenkopf, falsely stating that
he served in a different unit. Id at 1172-73.
99. See Act of June 16, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555, § 13, 64 Stat. 219, 227 (1950)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1962 (Supp. 1950)) [hereinafter Section 13]. Through this
amendment, Congress added the specific exclusion of visa applicants vho "advocated or
assisted in the persecution of any person because of race, religion or national origin .... " Id
100. See DPA § 13, 62 Stat. at 1014 (creating the DPC to investigate whether applicants
participated in "movement[s] ... hostile to ... the United States...").
101. United States v. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. 1114, 1121 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
102. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (explaining the amendment to the DPA that
altered visa eligibility from categorical ineligibility to targeting and thereby excluding those
who advocated or assisted in persecution).
103. Id Instruction Memorandum 242, issued in November 1951, lifted the per se ex-
cludability of members of certain SS units, but left in tact the per se excludability of former
Waffen SS Totenkopfierband (Death's Head Unit) members.
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remained excludable.'14
In June 1954, Lindert filed a new questionnaire to apply for an immigrant visa
under the RRA.10 Lindert ultimately received a visa in Salzburg, Austria on Janu-
ary 14, 1955. 106 The United States government failed to learn of Lindert's service
as an SS concentration camp guard before it issued him his visa.10 7 Within one
month of receiving his visa, Lindert moved to the United States with his wife.'"8
On September 29, 1961, Lindert initiated the application process for United
States citizenship by filing an N-400 Form.' 9 In order to thoroughly examine
Lindert's file, the naturalization examiner suspended the case for eleven months."1
0
On December 6, 1962, Lindert received his Certificate of Naturalization, granting
him the privilege of United States citizenship."' His application omitted all refer-
104. See 8 C.F.R. § 702.8 (1950, 1951) (excluding, inter alia, Nazis, members of
movements hostile to the United States and its form of government, and those who advo-
cated or assisted in persecution based on race, religion, or national origin). See generally
United States v. Breyer, 41 F.3d 884 (3d Cir. 1994) (affirming the denaturalization of a
former Waffen SS Totenkopf member who never revealed this membership on his 1951
application under the DPA's altered standards); United States v. Tittjung, 753 F. Supp. 251,
253 (E.D. Wis. 1990) (revoking naturalization of a former Waffen SS Totenkopf member
who served at Mauthausen), aff'd, 948 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir. 1991).
105. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1121. Upon receipt of a questionnaire, the Consulate typi-
cally established a file on an applicant. Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 938 (testimony of
Jelinek). The Consulate then informed the applicant of documentation and procedures re-
quired for the processing of the application. Id After gathering further documentation, such
as the applicant's birth certificate, travel document, police certificate or military discharge
certificate, the Consulate referred the case to the Investigations Relief Program ("IRP") for
investigation. Id. at 952-53. The IRP, the investigative arm of the Refugee Relief Program,
executed the security and investigative provisions of the RRA. Id. at 890-91 (testimony of
Wolfgang Lehmann, an assistant investigator at the Department of State charged with im-
plementing the RRA's security provisions). The IRP used the security investigation to ver-
ify the applicant's representations or develop any potentially adverse information. Id. at
909. Applicants rejected under the amended DPA were able to receive de novo considera-
tion under the RRA. 22 C.F.R. § 44.3(g) (1954).
106. Lindert, 907F. Supp. at 1121.
107. Id. at 1122. See discussion infra Parts III.B-III.C (illustrating that the revelation of
such information would have negated Lindert's chances of obtaining a visa).
108. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1122.
109. Id. According to the standard operating procedures in effect in 1961 and 1962, after
receipt of the N-400 Form, the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") would in-
terview the applicant and obtain sworn testimony concerning the applicant's qualifications
for citizenship. Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 661-62 (testimony of Frank Siracusa,
former naturalization examiner). In order to verify each assertion made by the applicant on
his/her N-400 Form, the examiner would question the applicant without any other witnesses
present. Id. at 662-68.
110. Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 682-84 (testimony of Siracusa).
11. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1122 (citing Mahoning County Common Pleas Ct., Pet.
No. 26492, Certificate No. 7914531, Lindert's naturalization proceeding).
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ence to his service as a Death's Head guard at Mauthausen or Loibl-Pass.1
2
I. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT'S MISAPPLICATION OF
PRECEDENT IN UNITED STATES V LINDERT
The District Court for the Northern District of Ohio failed to acknowledge that
international precedent directly applies to Lindert's case.' 13 In response to the first
count of the OSI's three-count complaint, the court found that Lindert did possess
good moral character; this finding negated the government's argument that the
lack of this prerequisite made his citizenship illegal." 4 In response to the second
count, the court held that the government failed to establish that Lindert illegally
procured United States citizenship through false testimony given for the purpose of
obtaining immigration and naturalization benefits."15 Lastly, the court concluded
that Lindert did not procure his citizenship by concealment or willful misrepresen-
tation." 6 In reaching these conclusions, the court failed to apply apposite interna-
tional precedent and principles from Nirnberg. Consideration of such precedent
requires a finding contradictory to that of the Northern District of Ohio.
A. LINDERT ILLEGALLY PROCURED HIS CITIZENSHIP BECAUSE HE LACKED GOOD
MORAL CHARACTER
1. The District Court's Holding in Lindert
The district court held one's mere service as a concentration camp guard, absent
direct contact with prisoners and particular acts of brutality, insufficient to estab-
lish his lack of good moral character." 7 Although finding that superiors gave
Lindert perpetual "orders to shoot [to kill] escaping prisoners"" 8 and that he al-
ways carried a weapon to execute those orders, the court remained unconvinced of
112. Id. See Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 699-700 (testimony of Siracusa)
(testifying that the standard operating procedures in effect in 1961 and 1962 would have
prevented the naturalization examiner from recommending citizenship for an applicant
known to have Lindert's Death's Head history); see also lt at 483-84 (testimony of Syd-
nor) (indicating that the British would have scrutinized Lindert as a Prisoner of War
("POW") more intensely had information indicated that he served in a camp and not in an
SS field division).
113. See United States v. Altfuldisch, No. 000-50-5, 3192 (DJAWC, Dachau 13 May
1946) (holding the concentration camps' nature sufficiently criminal to warrant a finding of
culpability and criminal responsibility of the individual Waffen SS members).
114. United States v. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. 1114, 1125-26 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
115. Id at 1126.
116. Id. at 1128. Cf. United States v. Tittiung, 753 F. Supp. 251, 254 (E.D. Wis. 1990)
(finding that nondisclosure of membership in Maffen SS Totenkopf, whether willful or inad-
vertent, constituted grounds for immigration ineligibility), aft'd, 948 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir.
1991).
117. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1125-26.
118. Id. at 1125.
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this link to a judgment of Lindert's moral character. Instead, the court noted the
government's failure to establish that Lindert himself shot at a prisoner.' 19
Unlike the majority of courts that have considered cases brought by the OSI,120
the Lindert court declined to use general conclusions about the camp to infer the
nature of the individual's role in it. Instead, the court separated its analysis by first
characterizing concentration camps generally,' 2 1 and then exploring Lindert's per-
sonal history as a guard.'2 The former analysis describes the extreme persecutory
conduct that often occurred.T2 The court distinguished areas of more extreme per-
secution where Lindert testified he did not enter;124 that is, the court's portrayal of
the facts supported Lindert's claims that he really operated independently from the
places where the "hands-on" persecution occurred. By framing the facts in this
manner, the court minimized Lindert's participation in the persecution that oc-
curred in and around Mauthausen. In effect, the Lindert court unilaterally rebutted
the applicable presumption of guilt laid down by the IMT.12s
2. International and United States Cases Provide Guidelines for
Lindert
a. Cases Involving Nazi Collaborators
The principles bequeathed by Ntrnberg126 certify that courts must hold perpe-
trators of crimes against humanity responsible for their actions, 127 even after dec-
ades have passed.12 Since the OSI's creation, American courts have discerned that
119. Id. at 1125-26.
120. See infra note 129 and accompanying text (indicating holdings that the duties as-
sociated with the defendant's service during World War II qualified as aiding persecution).
121. Lindert, 907F. Supp. at 1117-18.
122. Id. at 1119-20.
123. Id. at 1117-18. See discussion supra Part II.A (providing some explicit details of
such conduct).
124. See Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1119-20 (citing the Appelplatz, the protective custody
camp, and the floor of the Wiener Graben, Vienna Ditch, or quarry floor).
125. See supra text accompanying note 27 (explaining how the IMT standard allowed
indictments based merely on membership in a criminal organization).
126. See supra note 27 (relating the axioms provided by the Ntrmberg trials).
127. Id.; see Narnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 108, 143 (IMT 1946) (indicting every member
of the SS Totenkopf and attributing knowledge of the organization's criminal programs to
each member).
128.See ALAN S. ROSENBAUM, PROSECUTING NAzI WAR CRmINALs 119-21
(1993) (maintaining that the "passage of time" argument lacks merit). Rosen-
baum accurately calls the passage of time ... irrelevant to the determination of
criminal or moral responsibility. For if anything, extensive passage of time
between the commission of war crime and its legal redress should be regarded
as borrowed or privileged freedom and count against, not for, the "war crime"
defendant. Evasion ofjustice is never a moral defense or excuse.
Id. at 121.
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an individual organization's persecutory nature, evidenced by the duties required
by its members and its collaboration with the Nazi program, renders members in-
eligible for immigration benefits, for mere membership with such responsibilities
equals assistance in Nazi-sponsored persecution. 12 9 In many of the OSI's cases,' °
the courts never reached the issue of whether the defendants personally committed
identifiable acts, finding such proof irrelevant under the statutes131 Nevertheless,
the courts found that these Nazi collaborators did assist in Nazi-sponsored perse-
cution by virtue of the service they performed in units or organizations that func-
tioned primarily to carry out Nazi criminality.
13 2
Other cases involving alleged participants in Nazi-sponsored persecution sup-
port the contention that the Lindert court erred. These cases, involving various
types of immigration and naturalization situations, illustrate the types of analysis
129. See, e.g., Kalejs v. INS, 10 F.3d 441, 444 (7th Cir. 1993) (contending that the gen-
eral nature of the individual's role in the war, performing as part of a unit, may presume
assistance in persecution), cerL denied, 114 S. CL 1305 (1994); United States v. Schmidt,
923 F.2d 1253, 1259 (7th Cir. 1986) (same); Schellong v. INS, 805 F.2d 655, 660 (7th Cir.
1986) (same); United States v. Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that
if the government had known Kowalchuk served in a Nazi-affiliated militia, he would not
have received an entry visa); United States v. Linnas, 685 F.2d 427, 429 (2d Cir. 1981)
(contending that the general nature of the individual's role in the war, performing as part of
a unit, may presume assistance in persecution); United States v. Breyer, 829 F. Supp. 773,
778 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (finding that Death's Head membership and perimeter guard service
constitutes per se assistance in persecution because of the nature of the guards' duties), aff'd
in part and vacated in part, 41 F.3d 884 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Baumann, 764 F.
Supp. 1335, 1337 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (holding that mere proof of service as an armed concen-
tration camp guard equals "assistance in persecution" under Section 13 of the DPA), off'd,
958 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Leprich, 666 F. Supp. 967, 968 (E.D. Mich.
1987) (concluding that if the government had known Leprich served as a Mauthausen
guard, it would have denied his visa application); United States v. Osidach, 513 F. Supp.
51, 72 (E.D. Pa.) (holding that if the government had known Osidach served in a militia
supervised by the Nazis, it would have denied his visa application), appeal dismissed on
defendant's death, No. 81-1956 (3d Cir. 1981). But ef Laipenieks v. INS, 750 F.2d 1427,
1431 (9th Cir. 1984) (depending upon the intent of the Holtzman Amendment and compel-
ling "active personal involvement," not "mere acquiescence or membership in an organiza-
tion" to activate Section 1251(a)(19)'s deportability provision).
130. GEnmNLAW, supra note 37, pt. 6, § I, at 1. As of December 1995, the OSI had (1)
investigated 333 individuals; (2) litigated sixteen cases; (3) placed more than 60,000 people
on the "watchlis" for exclusion purposes; (4) excluded eighty people at United States ports
since 1989; (5) removed forty-four individuals from the United States, including three ex-
tradited to stand trial abroad; (6) sought the denaturalization or removal of ninety-nine in-
dividuals; and (7) denaturalized fifty-two individuals.
131. Compare cases cited supra note 129 (finding Totenkopf membership equals aiding
persecution because of the conduct required by its members) with Petkiewytsch v. INS, 945
F.2d 871, 880 (6th Cir. 1991) (requiring evidence of particular acts of egregious conduct for
a finding of deportability).
132. See supra note 129 and discussion infra Part ILI.A.I (explaining that the conduct
required by concentration camp guards amounted to assistance in persecution).
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utilized by the courts to define "assistance in persecution." Though these cases
involve some arguments that appear inapplicable at first glance to Lindert, the
Lindert court's careful examination and application of these arguments might have
created a different outcome.
In the pivotal case of Fedorenko v. United States,133 the Supreme Court con-
firmed that an individual's capacity in serving the Third Reich can, in and of itself,
establish the individual's involvement in Nazi-sponsored persecution and thus,
his/her ineligibility for a visa under the DPA. 134 This determination hinges neither
upon recourse to the Inimical Lists135 nor proof of personal perpetration of atroci-
ties. 136 In essence, the Supreme Court ratified the exclusion of former Nazi col-
laborators from the United States based on their wartime service in certain Nazi
units.
137
Many cases alleging assistance in Nazi-sponsored persecution involve men who
served at Nazi concentration camps and who admit only to the performance of pe-
rimeter guard duties. 138 By preventing inmates from escaping their inhuman and
often fatal internment, however, such SS personnel ensured the prisoners' contin-
ued subjection to heinous Nazi oppression. 39 The concentration camp guard cases
have typically relied on the precedent of Kungys 
14 or Fedorenko.141
Whether the specific role played by an individual included direct contact with
133. 449U.S.490(1981).
134. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 510-13 (1981) (determining that "the
plain language of the [DPA]" deems an armed Nazi concentration camp perimeter guard
ineligible for a DPA visa by virtue of per se assistance in persecution).
135. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing the inimical lists).
136. See supra notes 128-132 (presenting the Court's view that concentration camp
guard service constitutes persecution because of the nature of the conduct inherent in such
service).
137. See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 490 (finding that Fedorenko's wartime activities made
his procurement of an immigrant visa illegal).
138. See, e.g., id. (reporting the petitioner's claim that he acted solely as a perimeter
guard); United States v. Breyer, 41 F.3d 884, 890 (3d Cir. 1994) (same); Petkiewytsch v.
INS, 945 F.2d 871, 872 (6th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Schmidt, 923 F.2d 1253,
1259 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Kungys, 571 F. Supp. 1104, 1119 (D.N.J.
1983) (same); United States v. Hutyrczyk, 803 F. Supp. 1001, 1005 (D.N.J. 1992) (same),
appeal dismissed on defendant's death, No. 92-5659 (3d Cir. Mar. 2, 1993); In re Kuile, 19
I. & N. Dec. 318, 329 (B.I.A. 1985) (same), aft'd, 825 F.2d 1188, 1192 (7th Cir. 1987).
139. Cf United States v. Osidach, 513 F. Supp. 51, 99 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (recognizing that
the guards' mere presence, coupled with the demonstrated means and inclination to inflict
indignities, physical abuse, or death constitutes mental persecution), appeal dismissed on
defendant's death, No. 81-1956 (3d Cir. July 22, 1981); Kulle, 19 1. &. N. at 332 (finding
that an alleged perimeter guard, even one claiming ignorance of persecution inside the
camp, cannot escape responsibility for the other guards' conduct).
140. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988).
141. See, e.g., Kalejs v. INS, 10 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 1985) (utilizing the Supreme Court's
analysis in Kalejs as guidance); United States v. Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d 488 (3d Cir. 1985)
(utilizing the Court's analysis in Fedorenko); Osidach, 513 F. Supp. at 65 (same).
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victims remains irrelevant. Persecution on the basis of race, religion, national ori-
gin, or political opinion constituted the very mission of the Nazi concentration
camps. 14 Every SS enlistee who served as an armed guard worked primarily to
realize that goal.141 Arguably, if every concentration camp guard participated in a
criminal conspiracy, 144 and if participation in a criminal conspiracy demonstrates
bad moral character, then it follows that former employment as a concentration
camp guard compels a finding of bad moral character.
The scrutiny and appraisals that courts have accorded other Nazi units and or-
ganizations provide guidance for guard cases. Courts in these cases have focused
on the individual's conduct. Specifically, the courts have looked to the individual's
involvement in Nazi-sponsored persecution, established by reference to the nature
of his position and proven responsibilities within the Nazi system to determine
"assistance in persecution."
In United States v. Osidach,145 the district court found that willing, active mem-
142. See Nfirnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 78-106, 117 (IMT 1946) (describing the Nazis'
systematic persecution of individuals based on their race, religion or ethnicity and recount-
ing that concentration camps existed primarily to punish those found "obnoxious to German
authority"); LucY S. DAWmowicz, THE VAR AGAiNsT TH JEvs: 1933-1945 (1975)
(detailing the Nazi persecution of the Jews).
143. See Nirnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. at 78-106 (indicting the SS for its critical role in exe-
cuting the Third Reich's "Final Solution" and assigning a rebuttable presumption of guilt to
its members). As proffered by one scholar:.
[Miembership in such Nazi organizations [constitutes] a prima facie reason to
believe in the moral and/or legal blameworthiness of each individual member
proportionate to the role, behavioral consequences, and function of the organi-
zation in the Nazi system. Certainly, mere membership in a criminal organiza-
tion [exists] itself [as] a criminal offense....
ROSENBAUM, supra note 128, at 122. Rosenbaum further proposes the moral culpability of
those individuals who did not directly plan or perpetrate atrocities; for example, women in a
Nazi booster club shared culpability because their indoctrinating role perpetuated the perse-
cution. Id at 96-97.
See also Michelle Lesie & Bill Sloat, The Devil Knows Wiere: The Trail of John Dam-
janjuk, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Nov. 13, 1994, at 14 (quoting \Verner Dubois, an SS
soldier who served at Sobibor Concentration Camp and faced trial for his actions in Hagen,
Germany in 1966). As Dubois explained to a West German court:
What I did was aiding in murder. If I should be sentenced, I would consider
that correct ... In weighing the guilt, one should not, in my opinion, consider
the specific functions of the camp [personnel]. Wherever we were posted there,
we were all equally guilty. The camp functioned in a chain of functions. If only
one element in that chain is missing, the entire enterprise comes to a stop.
Id Dubois' profound comments imply the appropriateness of applying conspiracy doctrine
to cases involving crimes against humanity. See discussion infra Part Ill.A.2.b (applying
conspiracy theory of criminality to Nazi concentration camp guard cases). For a discussion
of Dubois' functions at Sobibor, see YrrzHAK ARAD, BELZEC, SOBrBOR, TRBLINKA: THE
OPERATION REnHAW DEATH Cnn's 29, 370, 400 (1987).
144. See supra note 113; infra note 160; discussion infra Part ll.A2..b.
145. 513 F. Supp. 51, 72 (E.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed on defendant's death, No. 81-
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bership in the Nazi-controlled Ukrainian police warranted a finding of visa ineli-
gibility under the DPA, even absent proof of the defendant's personal participation
in atrocities.146 The court ruled that Osidach's job of patrolling the streets while
armed and wearing the dreaded Ukrainian Police's uniform established participa-
tion in "mental persecution" under "the plain language of the statute."'
47
Similarly, another district court that applied Fedorenko found that "everyone
associated with the schutzmannschaft" must have been cognizant of the "harsh re-
pressive measures" they executed as affiliates of the Nazi program of persecu-
tion. 14 This court recognized that the responsibilities assigned to auxiliary forces
outside of Germany enabled the Nazi government to advance its mandate. 4 9 Spe-
cifically, the Nazis used indigenous personnel in the Ukraine to wage their cam-
paign and to enforce their edicts.15 The personnel comprising these auxiliary
forces assisted in persecutory conduct by performing duties assigned by the Nazis,
thereby permitting the Nazi program to flourish.' 5' This finding rendered the de-
fendant ineligible for a visa under the DPA, despite the lack of definitive proof that
the visa-issuing officer would have denied the defendant's 1949 visa application
had the truth surfaced.1
52
Courts have also held that a naturalization applicant's concealment of service in
a Nazi-sponsored persecutory unit constitutes a "material" concealment or misrep-
resentation that independently warrants denaturalization. 53 In fact, defendants in
1956 (3d Cir. July 22, 1981).
146. United States v. Osidach, 513 F. Supp. 51, 72 (E.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed on defen-
dant's death, No. 81-1956 (3d Cir. July 22, 1981).
147. Id. at 72, 99 (recognizing that mental persecution resulted from the "conspicuous
[and regular] public display of armed force and uniformed authority ... over a long period
of time in a repressive [environment]").
148. United States v. Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. 72, 81-82 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, 773
F.2d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1985).
149. Id
150. Id.
151. Id. These routine duties included:
enforc[ing] martial law restrictions imposed by the Germans, including beating
Jews found outside the ghetto after curfew, beating or severely reprimanding
Jews who failed to wear the required insignia, assisting the Germans in confis-
cating valuables from the Jewish inhabitants, arresting and participating in the
harsh punishment of persons involved in black-market activities or subversive
activities hostile to the German occupation forces.
Id. at 81. Additionally, testimony during the trial made apparent that members of the Ukrainian
militia joined German gendarmes who rounded up individuals for forced labor or arrested them
for alleged infractions and witnessed a multitude of executions of these individuals shortly
thereafter. Id
152. Id.
153. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 509-514 (1981) (finding willful
concealment of Treblinka service material and worthy of visa ineligibility); accord, United
States v. Schellong, 547 F. Supp. 569, 575 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (asserting the materiality of a
failure to reveal former service as a guard supervisor at Dachau Concentration Camp), affd,
717 F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1983), af'd, 718 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1983). Cf Kalejs v. INS, 10
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OSI cases were able to enter the United States by fraudulently concealing or mis-
representing their assistance in Nazi-sponsored persecution for the purpose of
gaining entrance to the United States and United States citizenship.1
54
In the case of Kalejs v. INS, 15 the Seventh Circuit upheld the deportation of an
alien under the Holtzman Amendment for assistance in persecution.5 6 Kalejs had
been a member of the notorious "Arajs Kommando," an indigenous Latvian police
unit sponsored and controlled by the Nazis.'5 The court determined whether an
individual assisted in persecution by examining the characteristics of the person's
service under the Third Reich.158 More specifically, the court focused on what re-
sponsibilities corresponded to the person's position and what duties the person
would have performed.159 Furthermore, the court analogized a concentration camp
to a criminal conspiracy, attributing liability to all participants. 60 Essentially, the
court applied Article 9 of the Charter,16 1 without expressly employing its language,
to defendant Kalejs as a member of an inimical conspiracy.162
b. Cases Involving Concentration Camp Guards
Internationally, prosecutors and legislative bodies have explicitly or implicitly
acknowledged that the invidious Nazi agenda served as the raison d'Etre for cer-
tain organizations, groups and units and have therefore pursued their individual
members.'6 In analyzing service in concentration camp guard detachments and
other persecutory units, German courts deem the former concentration camp
F.3d 441, 445-47 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1305 (1994) (finding that failure
to indicate service in a German mobile killing unit warranted deportation).
154. See cases cited supra note 153 (providing examples of those who both participated in
Nazi-sponsored persecution and fraudulently concealed said participation).
155. 10 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 1993), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 1305 (1994).




159. Id at444 (citing Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 n.34 (1931)).
160. Id at 445-47 (citing Kalejs, 981 F.2d 937, 943 (7th Cir. 1992)).
161. See discussion supra Part L.A and supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text
(providing background information about the Charter and the London Agreement).
162. Kalejs, 10 F.3d at 444 (attributing the entire unit's atrocities "to the individual
[because of] his membership and seeming participation").
163. See, e.g., [Austl.] Att'y Gen.'s Dep't, Report of the Investigations of War Criminals
in Australia 125 (Austl. Gov't Pubs. Serv. 1993) ("From the evidence at hand [one cannot
easily] imagine that anyone who served with the [12th Lithuanian Police] Battalion was not
implicated in its genocidal patterns of behaviour."); Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46,
as amended by R.S.C. 1985, c. 30 (3d Supp.), s. 1 (permitting the Canadian government to
prosecute residents who allegedly participated in Nazi war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity); supra note 37 (discussing the British government's enactment of the War Crimes
Act in 1991 to confer jurisdiction over "acts of murder and manslaughter, or culpable
homicide" in Germany or German-occupied territories between 1933 and 1945 and the first
case brought under this act in 1995).
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guards' failure to request reassignment a critical factor that supports conviction
and may justify a longer prison sentence.
64
In adjudicating the eligibility for immigration and naturalization of OSI's sub-
jects, American jurisprudence has developed a similar understanding of the crimi-
nal program executed by the Nazi system. For example, in Kairys v. INS, 163 an-
other case involving a former Nazi concentration camp guard, the Seventh Circuit
explained why such service constituted "assistance in persecution":
If [courts treated] the operation of such a camp ... as an ordinary criminal con-
spiracy, the armed guards, like the lookouts for a gang of robbers, would be
deemed co-conspirators, or if not, certainly aiders and abettors of the conspiracy;
and no more should be required to satisfy the noncriminal provision of [the
Holtzman Amendment] that makes assisting in persecution a ground for deporta-
164. E.g., Germany v. Swidersky, Provincial Ct. Weiden, Upper Palatinate (LG 1971),
295 (convicting the defendant for his awareness of and complicity in the commission of
crimes at the concentration camp and noting his lack of effort to transfer); Germany v.
Kfibler, Provincial Ct. Weiden, Upper Palatinate (LG 1957), 41 (same); Germany v.
Fischer, Ct. of Assizes, St. Ct. Weiden, Upper Palatinate (LG 1956), 10 (underscoring the
ability to request an alternative assignment to concentration camp duty and acknowledging
the readily available option of transferring to the front); GIDEON HAUSNER, JUSTICE IN
JERUSALEM 384 (1986) (quoting former Waffen SS General Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski,
who similarly testified in the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem that transferring presented an al-
ternative to concentration camp service and created no danger to the transferees' lives);
Henry Friedlander, Responses to World War Two War Criminals and Human Rights Viola-
tors: National and Comparative Perspectives, 8 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 3, 5-6 (1988)
(asserting that "[i]n forty years of judicial proceedings, ... no one has ever proved that
[refusal] to carry out a criminal order" resulted in punishment). Friedlander noted that, con-
versely, refusal to execute orders did not terminate career paths or possibilities for promo-
tion. Id. See generally Daniel Goldhagen, The "Cowardly" Executioner: On Disobedience
in the SS, 19 PATrERNS OF PREJUDICE 19 (1985) (citing orders issued by Himmler permitting
SS members to request transfers to avoid killing). In direct contradiction German scholar
Adalbert Rickerl asserts:
The inability to adduce any single case to show that refusal to carry out crimi-
nal orders resulted in injury to life and limb does not appear so astonishing
when one bears in mind that non-compliance with an order entailing a special
degree of severity was not regarded pursuant to SS ideology (as enunciated by
Himmler personally) as disloyalty but as personal weakness. It merely barred
the person concerned from further promotion within the SS.
ADALBERT ROCKERL, THE INVESTIGATION OF NAZI CRIMEs 1945-1978: A DOCUMENTATION
81-82 (Derek Rutter trans., 1979). But see David H. Kitterman, Those Who Said "Nol"
Germans Who Refitsed to Execute Civilians During World War II, II GERM. STUD. REV.
241 (1988) (citing cases of SS-men who gained promotions and even earned medals after
refusing to obey criminal orders). Cf United States v. Schiffer, 831 F. Supp. 1166, 1174
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (recognizing a transfer from concentration camp guard duty as a viable al-
ternative to continuing collaboration in persecutory acts), affd, 31 F.3d 1175 (3d Cir.
1994).
165. 981 F.2d 937, 943 (7th Cir. 1992).
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tion.l6
The court did not require proof of personal perpetration of individual atroci-
ties. 167 Instead, the court claimed that a camp guard, by definition, assisted in per-
secution regardless of whether he mistreated an inmate "beyond [behavior] im-
plicit in serving as a guard at such a camp ... ,'6 The holding essentially states
that because Nazi concentration camps were places of persecution and guards at
those camps held prisoners captive and threatened them with death for failing to
follow orders, the guards aided in persecution 69 By reaching its analogy of the
bank robber conspiracy theory, the Kairys court indirectly applied the Nurnberg
principle regarding criminal cooperation. 70 Simple membership in the conspiracy
equals "assistance in persecution" and therefore requires sanctioning.17 Many
courts have reached similar results.'17
Trials of concentration camp guards administered by the American military tri-
bunals immediately after the Second World War resulted in convictions of 885
individuals out of 1,021 accused." 3 The OSI has successfully prosecuted thirty-
four cases against former Nazi concentration camp guards.' Of these thirty-four
166. Kairys v. INS, 981 F.2d 937, 943 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing the Holtzman Amendment,
supra note 64) (emphasis added).
167. Ra
168. Id
169. Id (citing Schellong v. INS, 805 F.2d 655,661 (7th Cir. 1986)).
170. See U.N. WVAR CRmms COMi'N, supra note 27, at 50 (establishing tests, submitted
by the prosecution, for creating a rebuttable presumption of guilt). The IMT held:
A criminal organization is analogous to a criminal conspiracy in that the es-
sence of both is co-operation for criminal purposes. There must be a group
bound together and organized for a common purpose. The group must be
formed or used in connection with the commission of crimes denounced by the
Charter.
Id See also supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing how the Charter indicted or-
ganizations with the purpose of creating a presumption of criminality applicable to all
members of the indicted organizations in later prosecutions).
171. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
172. See cases cited supra note 129 (treating membership in the indicted units asper se
assistance in persecution because of the duties assigned to these units).
173. ROCKERP, supra note 164, at 27.
174. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981) (affirming the denaturalization of
a former SS guard at Treblinka); United States v. Schiffer, 31 F.3d 1175 (3d Cir. 1994)
(affirming the denaturalization of a former SS guard who served at Sachsenhausen, la-
jdanek, Hersbrueck and the SS training camp at Tra\vniki); Kalejs v. INS, 10 F.3d 441 (7th
Cir. 1993) (deporting an officer of the Arajs Kommando and guard supervisor at the
Salaspils Concentration Camp near Riga, Latvia), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1305 (1994);
Kairys v. INS, 981 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming the deportation of a former guard
and guard platoon leader at Treblinka Labor Camp and guard at the Trawniki SS Training
Camp and its detachment in Lublin, Poland); United States v. Tittjung, 948 F.2d 1292 (7th
Cir. 1991) (affirming the denaturalization of a former SS guard at Mauthausen and its sub-
camp, Gross Raining); United States v. Schmidt, 923 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1991) (affirming
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the denaturalization order of a former SS guard at Sachsenhausen); In re Kulle, 825 F.2d
1188 (7th Cir. 1987) (affirming the denaturalization of an individual who once served as an
SS guard, guard leader and SS instructor with the SS Death's Head at the Gross-Rosen
Concentration Camp); United States v. Schellong, 717 F.2d 329 (7th Cir.) (denaturalizing a
former SS guard who served in various SS guard companies, first as a guard and later as a
company commander, at the Sachsenburg and Dachau Concentration Camps), aff'd, 718
F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Linnas, 685 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1982) (affirming
the denaturalization of a former chief and commander of the guards at the concentration
camp in Tartu, Estonia); United States v. Demjanjuk, 680 F.2d 32 (6th Cir. 1982)
(affirming the denaturalization of a former SS guard at Treblinka, Sobibor and the Trawniki
training and base camp, all located in Poland); United States v. Hammer, No. 94-CV-
74985-DT (E.D. Mich. 1996) (denaturalizing former armed SS guard at Auschwitz and
Sachsenhausen Concentration Camps and SS guard on inmate transports to and from
Auschwitz and Sachsenhausen and Mauthausen, who later transferred to the Flossenbuerg
Concentration Camp); United States v. Rydlinksis, No. 94-7341 (N.D. 111. July 21, 1995)
(denaturalizing, pursuant to default judgment, an individual who worked as an armed SS
guard of prisoners and SS dog handler in Auschwitz and Buchenwald); United States v.
Breyer, 841 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (denaturalizing a former SS guard at Buchenwald
in Germany and Auschwitz), affid in part and vacated in part, 41 F.3d 884, 890 (3d Cir.
1994); United States v. Hutyrczyk, 803 F. Supp. 1001 (D.N.J. 1992) (denaturalizing a for-
mer guard and guard leader at the Koldyczewo Concentration Camp in Belorussia), appeal
dismissed on defendant's death, No. 92-5659 (3d Cir. Mar. 2, 1993); United States v. Bless,
No. 92-2075 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 1992) (denaturalizing a former SS guard at Auschwitz);
United States v. Ziegler, No. 90-3064 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (denaturalizing, pursuant to default
judgment, a former SS guard at the Kaunas Concentration Camp in Lithuania and at the
Stutthof and Gotenhafen Concentration Camps in Poland); United States v. Zultner, No. 90-
1825 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 1990) (reporting that an SS guard at the Schwechat, Floridsdorf and
Moding subcamps of Mauthausen renounced his citizenship); United States v. Habich, No.
87-9546 (N.D. I11. Mar. 14, 1990) (deporting, pursuant to consent agreement, a former con-
centration camp guard who transferred prisoners from Gleiwitz subcamp of Auschwitz to
Mauthausen); United States v. Reger, No. 87-4906 (D.N.J. Sept. 8, 1988) (denaturalizing a
former SS guard at Auschwitz II (Birkenau)); United States v. Quintus, No. 87-70950 (E.D.
Mich. June 29, 1988) (denaturalizing, pursuant to a consent agreement, a former SS guard
at the Majdanek Concentration Camp in Poland); United States v. Bartesch, No. 86-2375
(N.D. I1l. May 29, 1987) (denaturalizing a former Mauthausen guard); United States v.
Leprich, 666 F. Supp. 967 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (permitting the voluntary departure of a for-
mer SS guard at Mauthausen after revoking naturalization); United States v. Leili, No. 86-
1370 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 1986) (denaturalizing a former Mauthausen guard on a motion for
summary judgment); United States v. Wieland, No. 86-1750 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
(denaturalizing, pursuant to default judgment, a former SS guard at Mauthausen); United
States v. Denzinger, 530 F. Supp. 1348 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (denaturalizing, pursuant to a de-
fault judgment, a former SS guard at Auschwitz, Mauthausen, Oranienburg, the Torgau
subcamp of Buchenwald, Plaszow, and the St. Georgen subcamp of Mauthausen); In re
Deneul, AI0 324 808 (Immigr. Ct., Miami, May 6, 1994) (deporting a former Gusen Con-
centration Camp guard who, along with other duties, guarded prisoners on a transport from
a camp in Poland to Mauthausen); In re Mueller, A10 339 377 (Immigr. Ct., Phoenix, Apr.
14, 1994) (recognizing voluntary relinquishment of United States citizenship by a former
SS guard at Natzweiler Concentration Camp in Alsace, France and at Schorzingen subcamp
of Natzweiler in Wuerttemberg, Germany); In re Schweidler, A14 342 976 (Immigr. Ct.,
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cases, the case of United States v. Lindert represents the first case to date in which
the government has not succeeded.175
c. Sixth Circuit's Deviation in Lindert
Unlike the majority of circuits that have examined the implications of Death's
Head Battalion service on United States immigration and naturalization, the Sixth
Circuit does not find service as a concentration camp guard, per se, tantamount to
assisting in persecution. 176 The discrepancy lies in the Sixth Circuit's interpretation
of the term "assisted" in the Holtzman Amendment. 1" A large body of jurispru-
dence attempts to define "assisted" in cases involving participants in Nazi-
sponsored persecutory acts. In looking for guidance to determine the meanin
courts have utilized the useful per se rule 
defined in United States v. Fedorenko.
t
In Fedorenko, the Court delineated a spectrum where an armed concentration
camp guard clearly stood at one end, "assisting in persecution," and someone who
cut prisoner's hair before execution stood at another.'" By defining the spectrum
in this manner, the Court eliminated all ambiguity regarding concentration camp
guards and explicitly declared their service as aiding persecution because of the
Miami, Dec. 13, 1993) (ordering the deportation of a former Mauthausen SS guard); In re
Hazners, All 229 347 (Immigr. Ct., Cleveland, Oct. 22, 1992) (deporting a former SS
guard at Auschwitz pursuant to consent agreement); In re Dorth, AS 194 183 (Immigr. Ct.,
Chicago, Sept. 17, 1990) (instituting deportation proceedings against a former SS guard at
Auschwitz, terminated due to his death); In re Ensin, AIO 226 043 (lmmigr. Ct., Boston,
June 20, 1990) (holding former SS guard deportable); In re Eckert, A1O 631 698 (Immigr.
Ct., Los Angeles, Sept. 27, 1988) (deporting a former SS guard pursuant to consent agree-
ment); In re Blach, AlO 629 292 (Immigr. Ct., Los Angeles, April 27, 1987) (denaturalizing
a former SS guard and dog handler at both Dachau in Germany and Wiener Neudorf in
Austria), aff'd, (B.I.A. Feb. 8, 1990); In re Lipschis, AIO 682 861 (Immigr. Ct., Chicago,
Dec. 23, 1982) (deporting a former SS guard at Auschwitz and Birkenau pursuant to a con-
sent agreement).
175. Indeed, the Lindert court referenced the unique perspective of Sixth Circuit law
five separate times during the trial. Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 314, 315, 510, 732,
1648.
176. Petkiewyjtsch v. INS, 945 F.2d 871, 871 (6th Cir. 1991); accord, United States v.
Osidach, 513 F. Supp. 51, 70 (E.D. Pa.) (providing in dicta that the interpretation of the
Holtzman Amendment's usage of "participation" and "assistance" exist only where the
guard performs "some personal activity involving persecution"), appeal dismissed on de-
fendant's death, No. 81-1956 (3d Cir. July 22, 1981). But see ROSENMAU., supra note 128,
at 101 (proposing that "an individual [victimizes others] not only when he or she actively
participates in an act of persecution or actively supports those who do, but also when an
individual gives no indication that he or she may disapprove of the offense to universal
standards") (emphasis added); cf Kalejs, 10 F.3d at 444 (holding that the court may pre-
sume one's assistance from the general nature of his/her role as part of a unit), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1007 (1994).
177. See supra note 64.
178. 449 U.S. 590, 512 n.34 (1981) ("Other cases may present more difficult line-
drawing problems but we need decide only this case.").
179. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 n.34 (1981).
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nature of the duties they performed.
Courts finding for the defendant in OSI cases have ignored the Charter's rebut-
table presumption of criminality 18 and looked instead to distinguish the per se
concentration camp guard rule defined by the Supreme Court in Fedorenko. Such
courts have split hairs to deny the rule's application to an armed concentration
camp guard who never admitted to the personal commission of a persecutory act.
Consequently, those judges dissatisfied with the Court's failure to define ade-
quately "assistance in persecution" have delved beyond the Holtzman Amend-
ment's plain language to determine legislative intent.
81
The House of Representatives hosted considerable debate on the Amendment.
Representative Holtzman, basing her definition of "persecution" on the Nalrnberg
trials, asserted that Congress "intended [the bill] to cover active participation and
not mere acquiescence by the population as a whole."' 8 2 Although Representative
Holtzman clearly found mere membership in the Nazi party distinguishable from
active participation 8 3 because as the Amendment's author, she specifically elected
not to employ the term "active." The precedent set by the Nlrnberg trials, referred
to in the Congressional debate, accomplished this distinction by indicting the or-
ganizations with links to "active participants."'1 4
In reaching its decision, the Lindert court relied heavily on Petkiewytsch v.
INS,185 a labor education camp case in which the Sixth Circuit distinguished Pet-
kiewytsch's service from the per se holding of Fedorenko18 6 and altered the prin-
ciples of statutory interpretation vis-A-vis the Holtzman Amendment. 187 In so do-
ing, the Lindert court followed suit in misreading Fedorenko and fostering the
unusual precedent set forth by Petkiewytsch.
In Petkiewytsch, the Sixth Circuit reversed the Board of Immigration Appeals
("BIA") and terminated deportation proceedings, finding that the defendant did not
"assist" in persecution within the meaning of the Holtzman Amendment. 18  In ac-
cordance with Supreme Court precedent, the court focused on the specific duties
and conduct of the defendant. Like Fedorenko, 189 Petkiewytsch had worn his
180. See supra note 27.
181. E.g., Laipenieks v. INS, 750 F.2d 1427, 1431 (9th Cir. 1985) (relying on the intent
of the Holtzman Amendment and requiring "active personal involvement" to activate the
deportability provision of Section 1251(a)(19)); Petkiewytsch, 945 F.2d at 879-880 (same);
Maikovskis v. INS, 773 F.2d 435, 435 (2d Cir. 1985) (same).
182. 124 CONG. REc. 31,649 (1978) (statement of Rep. Holtzman).
183. Id.
184. See supra note 27 (directing courts to use the precedent set by the Nalmberg trials
to determine the elements of "persecution"); see also H.R. REP. No. 95-1452, at 3 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4706 (same).
185. 945 F.2d 871, 880 (6th Cir. 1991) (reversing the BIA's affirmation of the decision
to deport Petkiewytsch).
186. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 n.34 (1981).
187. See supra note 64.
188. Petkiewytsch, 945 F.2d at 881.
189. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512 n.34.
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Death's Head Battalion insignia and carried an armed weapon at all times under
standing orders to shoot to kill escaping prisoners.
19 )
The court distinguished this case, however, by finding that Petkiewytsch served
only as a civilian guard at one of "the least punitive" of Nazi camps.19 1 Impor-
tantly, though, the court did agree with the BIA's characterization of Kiel-
Hassee,'9 the labor education camp which Petkiewytsch guarded, as a place of
persecution where "deprivations, torture and executions" took place.'9 The court
further noted that Petkiewytsch often viewed mistreatment of prisoners.'4 With
these acknowledgments, however, the court's attempt to mitigate Petkiewytsch's
culpability by finding this camp "less punitive" than others defies logic and sen-
sibility. The camps functioned because guards performed their duties. 19s Intern-
ment of prisoners existed because guards enforced the mles. 95 The court failed to
recognize that guards formed indispensable links in the chain of persecution and
should therefore face liability.
To distinguish Fedorenko precedent clearly from the Petddeiytsch case, the
Petkiewytsch court interpreted the Holtzman Amendment contrary to well-
established principles of statutory construction. When a question arises as to a
statute's interpretation, courts should look at the statute's "plain language" to re-
move any doubt.'9 The Holtzman Amendment specifically calls for the deporta-
tion of individuals who, in association with the Nazi government, "ordered, in-
cited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person, because
of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion."'19 Thus, the Amendment
sets out the standard of proof of "assistance" in persecution.'5 Congress' express
and deliberate use of the term "assisted" implies that courts should not discern and
define varying degrees of assistance among admitted SS guards. The statute's un-
ambiguous inclusion of the term "assist" encompasses all guards because all
guards performed guard duty which inherently entailed enforcing the persecution
that occurred within the camps. 200 The Petkieuytsch court essentially wrote the
term "assisted" out of the statute to reach its holding.
In order to conclude that serving as an armed camp guard who claims that he
190. Petkiewytsch, 945 F.2d at 880.
191. Id at 881.
192. Although the reported decisions spell "Kiel-Hassee" differently, the spelling used
herein is correct.
193. Petkiewytsch, 945 F.2d at 875-76.
194. Id at 872-3.
195. Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 853 (testimony of Sydnor).
196. Id at 517.
197. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (certifying
that statutory interpretation commences with "the language [of the statute] itself"); Ameri-
can Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (assuming that the "ordinary meaning
of the words used" accurately expresses the legislative purpose).
198. See supra note 27 (emphasis added).
199. See supra text accompanying note 64 and discussion Part M.A.1.
200. See discussion infra Part fI.A2.c.
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never personally beat or shot at prisoners20' differs from "active persecution," the
court determined that the Holtzman Amendment only applied to "Nazi war crimi-
nals" and those who "engaged in war crimes. ' '2t 2 The court determined that the
Holtzman Amendment requires "active participation in persecution going beyond
'assistance. ' ' 203 The court deemed the record lacking in evidence of such "active
persecution" and hence asserted that Petkiewytsch's deportation "would not fur-
ther the goal of the Holtzman Amendment and would carry out no discernible
policy of the United States. ' '204 The court ignored the rudimentary doctrine that
statutory language comprises "It]he starting point in statutory interpretation[.]
205
In determining the purpose of the Holtzman Amendment, the Petkiewytsch
court misconstrued statements found in the House of Representatives' Report 6 by
citing incomplete phrases.20 7 The very mandate of SS Totenkopf (Death's Head)
service sought to persecute and extinguish groups of persons based on their race,
religion, national origin, or political opinion.208 The House Report states that con-
duct constitutes "persecution" where the conduct aims "to deliberately inflict [sic]
severe harm or suffering on a particular person or group of persons. 20 9 Although
the House Report on the Holtzman Amendment indicates that a determination of
"persecution" depends upon case-by-case analysis, 20 proper application of Con-
gress' intent dictates a finding of "assistance in persecution" in the case of a con-
centration camp guard who followed orders.
21'
Following in the footsteps of the Petkiewytsch court, the Lindert court asserted
that a determination of "assistance in persecution" requires the government to
prove active participation. The court held that only proof of Lindert's own indi-
vidual acts of persecutory conduct would justify a finding of bad moral charac-
ter.213 The court found credible Lindert's testimony that he neither witnessed nor
201. Petkiewytsch v. INS, 945 F.2d 871, 881 (6th Cir. 1991) (reiterating the BIA's
finding that he never personally committed persecutory acts).
202. Id. at 878-79, 881.
203. Id. at 880.
204. 1d. at881.
205. United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 604 (1986) (citations omitted).
206. H.R. REP. No. 95-1452, at 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4700.
207. Petkiewytsch, 945 F.2d at 879-80.
208. Narnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. at 142 (reporting the SS's instructions "to assist the Nazi
Government in the ultimate domination of Europe and the elimination of all Inferior races").
209. H.R. REP. No. 95-1452, at 7 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4706.
210. Id.
211. See discussion supra Part III.A. 1.
212. Cf Kulle v. INS, 825 F.2d 1188, 1192 (7th Cir. 1987) (discounting Kulle's argument
that his actions as a concentration camp guard amounted only to "gross negligence"). The
Kulle court, following circuit precedent from Schellong v. INS, 805 F.2d 655, 665 (7th Cir.
1986), reiterated that proof that an individual served in a particularly notorious camp or per-
sonally committed an atrocity is not per se determinative of a finding of culpability. Id.
213. United States v. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. 1114, 1125 (N.D. Ohio 1995). But cf Ber-
enyi v. INS, 385 U.S. 630 (1967) (affirming the petitioner's denaturalization for failing to
reveal his past association with the Communist Party, even though he may have been a
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actively participated in the persecution of prisoners.? 4 The opinion grants this tes-
timony considerable weight by stating that the government failed to Present evi-
dence describing Lindert's responsibilities or service at Mauthausen. The court
ignored the precept that service as an armed concentration camp guard, as per the
Supreme Court's holding in Fedorenko,216 qualifies as "assistance in persecu-
tion.
217
The Lindert court, however, considered Fedorenko's admission of shooting at
Jewish prisoners as crossing the demarcation line between assistance and non-
assistance in persecution; only the former requires the reversal of a naturalization
order based on the absence of good moral character. The court found an absence of
testimony or evidence linking Lindert to a specific act of persecution sufficient to
discredit the government's claim that his mere service as a Mauthausen guard
proved his lack of good moral character by virtue of the duties of a Mauthausen
guard under Nazi direction.2 18 Essentially, the Lindert court ignored the Nurnberg
principle of criminal cooperation219 and the co-conspirator analogy presented by
the Kairys court, 20 utilizing instead the "line-drawing" analysis employed in Pet-
kiewytsch.2
1
The government argued that mere service as a concentration camp guard consti-
tutes bad moral character.2m By granting substantial credence to Lindert's testi-
mony and concluding that he possessed good moral character tm however, the
court ignored the implications behind Lindert's service as a guard.2 4 Scholarly
works directly contradict and belittle Lindert's assertions?25 Moreover, neighbors
mere a "nominal" member who joined while a student in response to Party pressures).
214. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1125.
215. Id
216. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490,512 n.34 (1981).
217. See discussion supra Part II.A.l.
218. See 124 CONG. REc. 31,648 (1978) (statement of Rep. Fish) (arguing that the Holtz-
man Amendment represents a compromise which "restrict[s] its application to those who en-
gaged in persecution at the direction of the Nazi government").
219. See supra note 27.
220. See discussion supra Part lIl.A.l.b.
221. See Petkiewytsch v. INS, 945 F.2d 871, 878-81 (6th Cir. 1991) (analyzing the con-
tinuum drawn by the Supreme Court in Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 506, 512 n.34 (1980)).
222. United States v. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. 1114, 1125 (N.D. Ohio 1995); Lindert
Complaint, supra note 8, at 6-7.
223. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1125.
224. Lindertjoined the SS, see supra text accompanying note 68 (dismissing the defense
of involuntariness), although his parents objected to his recruitment. Lindert, 907 F. Supp.
at 1119. Although he must have been aware of the camps' persecutory nature, see Nfirn-
berg Trial, 6 F.R.D. at 143 (attributing personal knowledge of the "criminal programs" to
all members of the SS), Lindert asserted his ignorance of the other guards' actions. Lindert
Record, supra note 58, at 1183 (testimony of Lindert) (claiming to be "outside guard chain,
[unaware of] what other people did").
225. See generally GORDON J. Hoarrz, IN THE SHADOW OF DEATm: LrvIG OutrsmE Tim
GmAs OF MAUTHAuSEN (1990) (recounting stories of the atrocities witnessed by the civilian
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of Mauthausen knew of the horrors that occurred within the camp and demanded
that the town's authorities discontinue "such inhuman deeds[.]"226 If,"those unfor-
tunate enough to live within view of the rock quarries" became accustomed to the
"sight of death, ' ' 227 then the Lindert court's support of guard testimony declaring
ignorance of persecution defies reason. If "kowledge [of the camp's happenings]
made its way far beyond the walls of the camp," 8 then surely Lindert, an SS
guard, knew of the criminal acts that took place there regularly. Furthermore, "[n]o
one honestly could deny knowing what an inmate looked like, and what it meant to
be a victim in the hands of the SS."229
In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has discredited the exact
credibility determination made by the Lindert court.230 In United States v. Schiffer,
the Third Circuit recognized that persons who served as concentration camp
guards "frequently claim[ed] to have served involuntarily, been stationed only on
the outside of the camps themselves, unaware of any mistreatment or punishment
or prisoners, unaware of [the reasons for the inmates' imprisonment] and in no
way personally involved in the mistreatment of a prisoner."23 In rejecting Schif-
fer's claims, the court further found his assertion of ignorance "completely con-
trary to historical facts and common sense.' z 2
Moreover, unlike the tribunal in the Nflrnberg Trial, the tribunal in United
States v. Al/iuldisch 233 issued a decision pertaining specifically to all Mauthausen
personnel . The IMT concluded that everyone who served at Mauthausen in Tn
capacity understood and knew the magnitude of the horrors perpetrated there.A
population of the town of Mauthausen).
226. Id at 35.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 40.
229. Id at 145-46.
230. Cf United States v. Schiffer, 831 F. Supp. 1166, 1185 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(discounting former concentration camp guards' testimony as "notoriously unreliable"), affd,
31 F.3d 1175 (3d Cir. 1994).
23 1. Id (citing Kulle v. United States, 825 F.2d 1188, 1992 (7th Cir. 1987)).
232. Id at 1181. Accord, Schellong v. INS, 805 F.2d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 1986) (disbelieving
the defendant's claim of unawareness of persecution); United States v. Schmidt, 923 F.2d
1253, 1258 (7th Cir. 1991) (rebuking the defense of lack of knowledge of persecution where
the defendant guarded prisoners wearing color-coded patches and escorted them to work sites,
where they sometimes collapsed).
Lindert testified that he found the treatment of prisoners at the British Prisoner of War
(POW) camps comparable to that of Mauthausen, despite the fact that Lindert worked on
farms. Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 1133, 1196 (testimony of Lindert). One should note,
however, that the British Army usually failed to guard or confine its POWs. Id.
233. No. 000-50-5, 3402 (DJAWC, Dachau 13 May 1946).
234. United States v. Altfuldisch, No. 000-50-5, 3402 (DJAWC, Dachau 13 May 1946).
235. Id. at 3509-10 (indicting all who served at Mauthausen). The IMT concluded:
The Court finds that the circumstances, conditions, and the very nature of the
Concentration Camp Mauthausen, combined with any and all of its by camps,
was of such a criminal nature as to cause every official, governmental, military
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The rendered decision went further to find everyone who served there criminally
responsible. ' 6 The IMT, through its plain and obvious language, clearly impli-
cated perimeter guards in its holding. In spite of the language and holdings in
Alifuldisch, however, the Lindert court granted considerable credibility to
Lindert's declaration that he had never stepped foot in the protective custody
camp 8 "during his entire service at Mauthausen."2 9 Similarly, the court believed
that Lindert never shot at a prisoner or treated any prisoner in a hostile manner.240
The Alq'uldisch decision24' and the holdings of the IMT 242 augment and highlight
the difficulty in accepting Lindert's assertions and the district court's findings.
The Lindert court clearly failed to consider the application of the IMT's find-
ings and conclusions.2 43 Instead, the court accepted Lindert's assertions of igno-
rance of the persecution that occurred around him.2  The Tribunal, however,
never would have accepted Lindert's testimony as credible. The Tribunal explicitly
attributed knowledge of the commonplace atrocities to the guards at Mauthausen,
regardless of their title or rank.245 No doubt can exist that the Tribunal presented a
and civil, and every employee thereof, whether he be a member of the Waffen
SS, Allgemeine SS, a guard, or civilian, to be culpably and criminally respon-
sible.
The Court therefore declares: That any official, governmental, military, or civil,
whether he be a member of the Waffen SS, Allgemeine SS, or any guard, or
civil employee, in any way in control of or stationed at or engaged in the op-
eration of the Concentration Camp Mauthausen, or any or all of its by camps in
any manner whatsoever, is guilty of a crime against the recognized laws, cus-
toms, and practices of civilized nations and the letter and spirit of the lavs and




238. See discussion supra Part I1.A (describing the conditions of the protective custody
camp).
239. United States v. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. 1114, 1120 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (emphasis
added).
240. Id at 1120, 1125.
241. United States v. Altfuldisch, No. 000-50-5, 3402, 3492 (DJAWC, Dachau 13 May
1946).
242. See generally Narnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. at 78-106 (indicting twenty-three high-
ranking Nazi officials).
243. See Linder4 907 F. Supp. 1114 (believing the defendant's claims of innocence despite
international law's presumptions to the contrary).
244. Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 1171-73 (testimony of Lindert) (testifying to his
lack of knowledge of other guards' commission of persecution and of the fact that prisoners
wore patches indicating their "crimes").
245. Altfuldisch, No. 000-50-5, at 3510 (negating assertions such as those made by Lindert
and many other defendants in OSI cases). The %MT found that:
it was impossible for a governmental, military or civil official, a guard or civil-
ian employee, of the Concentration Camp Mauthausen, combined with any or
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competent forum for the trial of the Mauthausen personnel and that its judgment
should apply equally to Lindert.246 The Alfuldisch decision should collaterally es-
top Mauthausen personnel from denying knowledge of the persecution that oc-
curred.
The Lindert court failed to apply international law and precedent. 247 Further-
more, it neglected to acknowledge any expert testimony248 or evidence presented
by the government.249 The court completely discredited both a Loibl-Pass survi-
all its camps, to have been in control of, been employed in, or present in, or
residing in, the aforesaid Concentration Camp Mauthausen, combined with any
or all of its by camps, at any time during its existence, without having acquired
a definite knowledge of its criminal practices and activities therein existing.
The Court further finds that the irrefutable record of deaths by shooting,
gassing, hanging, regulated starvation, and other heinous methods of killing,
brought about through the deliberate conspiracy and planning of Reich offi-
cials, either of the Mauthausen Concentration Camp and its attached by-camps,
or of the higher Nazi hierarchy, was known to all of the above parties, together
with prisoners, whether they be political, criminal or military.
Id. (emphasis added).
246. See Fogelson, supra note 29, at 847 (suggesting that the IMT deliberately framed its
charter in "universal language" to ensure its application beyond the immediate post-World War
II trials).
247. Cf United States v. Baumann, 764 F. Supp. 1335, 1337 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (holding
that mere proof of service as an armed concentration camp guard establishes "assistance in
persecution") (citing United States v. Schmidt, 923 F.2d 1253, 1259 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[Ihe
fact of his armed, uniformed service is sufficient to establish that he assisted in persecu-
tion."), aff'd, 958 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1992); In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp.
544, 556 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (granting Nmberg considerable weight in support of finding
the alleged crimes subject to universal jurisdiction). In Dem/anjuk, the court also found that
the United States' substantial role at Ntlmberg binds this country's courts to acknowledge
the criminality of the alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity. Id. The court, citing
the Nlmberg Trial for support, also rejected the argument that the constitutional ban on ex
post facto laws applies to participants in Nazi-sponsored persecution. Id. But see Kulle v.
INS, 825 F.2d 1188, 1193 (7th Cir. 1987) (sustaining a concentration camp guard's depor-
tation based on statutory law). The Kulle court asserted that "[tihe legal principles estab-
lished at Ntlmberg have contributed much to certain spheres of law and to the definition of
'persecution."' Id. The court noted, however, that the Ntlmberg principles "have no imme-
diate bearing on a deportation proceeding controlled by a statutory provision which ... util-
izes the term 'assisted' in persecution quite liberally." Id. (emphasis added).
248. For example, historian Charles Sydnor, a renowned expert on the history of Nazi
Germany, among other Consular and State Department officials, testified for the OSI.
Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 44-723, 746-862 (testimony of Sydnor); id. at 886-934
(testimony of Lehmann); id. at 935-98 (testimony of Jelinek); id. at 999-1011 (testimony of
Greener).
249. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1452, at 7 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.AN. at 4706
(advocating for the courts' application of "international material[,] ... such as the opinions
of the Nuremberg tribunals," to these situations). Recognizing the "difficult and delicate
determinations" involved in denaturalizing an alleged participant in Nazi-sponsored perse-
cutory acts, the House declared:
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vor's testimony and expert testimony that all guards would have performed all du-
ties and that no one guard served solely as a perimeter guard. 0 Had the Lindert
court considered the OSI's evidence, it would have discerned that the government
did not need to provide any more "particular evidence" regarding Lindert's service
in the camp beyond showing that Lindert guarded slave laborers from escaping
torture, gassing, starvation and execution. The court required the government to
present specific testimony connecting particular responsibilities and functions to
specific guards2s 1 and reproached the government for failing to offer evidence to
refute Lindert's claim that he never came into "direct contact with any prisoners"
because his superiors forbade him to do so.2 2 The court additionally required the
government to disprove Lindert's "credible" testimony that he "never touched,
threatened, or shot at a prisoner" with evidence of "specific actions.' ,2" 3 Requiring
"specific actions" means requiring a higher standard than criminal law provides for
a conspiracy charge 2 4 Certainty as to which particular function a particular guard
performed,e 5 however, is not relevant because concentration camps could not exist
without guards at all posts at all times? 6
It is an accepted precept of international law that "persecution" is a "crime
against humanity", condemned by all civilized nations. Invocation of U.S. do-
mestic law in furtherance of such an accepted international law principle should
not be precluded because it may in some instances necessitate difficult determi-
nations.
Id at 4707.
250. Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 370, 851-53 (testimony of Sydnor) (asserting that
all guards performed all the functions listed in the SS regulations, not just perimeter guard
service). But see id at 1172 (testimony of Lindert) (testifying that he served only on the
outside of the camp).
251. United States v. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. 1114, 1120 (N.D. Ohio 1995). The court
noted that guards could serve: (1) as escorts for prisoners on their way to and from work;
(2) in the guard towers which lined the perimeter fence; (3) in the inner camp's towers; or
(4) as escorts for non-prisoners passing through the camp. Id
252. Id It comes as no surprise that Lindert's superiors forbade him to mingle with the
prisoners. His presence, however, assisted in perpetuating the prisoners' inhumane exis-
tences because he ensured that they could not escape. See Kulle, 825 F.2d at 1192 (holding
that individuals who "held the prisoners captive" and forced them to work or face death ef-
fectively "assist[ed] in persecution"); see generally SEmViCE REGULAMONS FOR CON-
CENTRATION CAMps, supra note 94.
253. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1120.
254. See Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 612 (1949) (citing Schneiderman v.
United States, 320 U.S. 118, 158 (1943)) (signifying that the burden to revoke American
citizenship requires clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence, a burden much higher than
that in civil trials and equivalent to the prosecution's in criminal trials).
255. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1120 ('The records do not indicate which guards performed
which duties, and without specific testimony there is no way to be certain which function any
particular guard performed.").
256. See supra notes 232-44 and accompanying text (declaring all Mauthausen personnel
are criminally responsible for the persecution that occurred there) and text accompanying notes
194-95 (relating testimony that guards enabled concentration camps to exist).
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Although Lindert claims he never physically touched or shot at a prisoner,25 ' he
kept the prisoners inside the camp, where guards beat them, gassed them, kept
them malnourished, and forced them to endure subhuman conditions.25 He
guarded slave laborers. 9 Moreover, Lindert must have heard shots being fired at
prisoners at the base of the quarry. 26° Lindert did admit an ability to see the quarry
floor during some of his shifts as a perimeter guard.26' Consequently, if Lindert
knew about the persecution that he helped to perpetuate by virtue of his service in
the Totenkopf, a court could not rationally find that Lindert possesses good moral
character. United States v. Al~fuldisch declared all Mauthausen personnel guilty of
26223assisting in persecution. It follows that Article 10 of the Charter 263 expressly
demanded that the Lindert court apply the IMT's Altfuldisch holding to Lindert,
resulting in the unavoidable conclusion that Lindert lacks good moral character.
Furthermore, although scarce case law provides guidance for a showing of bad
moral character, if refusing to expose past Communist party membership can
qualify for denaturalization of an individual?6 and the morals of the individual's
neighborhood within the United States reflect the values embodied in the standard
of "good moral character,, 265 it follows then that Lindert's former service as a
concentration camp guard signifies a lack of good moral character.
The court refused to judge Lindert by the orders issued to him to shoot at escap-
257. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1125. But see cases cited supra note 232 (recognizing the in-
credulity of Lindert's assertions).
258. Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 131-32 (testimony of Sydnor) (relating that in Sep-
tember 1942, the SS instructed guards to work the prisoners to death). See discussion supra
Part II.A (describing the conditions at Mauthausen); cf In re Kulle, 19 1. & N. Dec. 318, 332
(B.I.A. 1985) (deeming proof of a concentration camp guard's personal commission of acts of
brutality unnecessary for a finding of aiding persecution and finding instead that involuntary
confinement of prisoners because of religion, race or political opinion qualifies as aiding per-
secution).
259. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1119-20 (relating typical guard duties and that Lindert served
as a perimeter guard). One should note the court's attempt to further limit Lindert's service as a
guard by characterizing the duties differently for various posts. Id. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 253-58 (arguing the irrelevancy of distinguishing between duties among concentra-
tion camp guards and arguing that a concentration camp guard is a concentration camp guard is
a concentration camp guard).
260. See Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 558 (statement by the court) (noting that a pe-
rimeter guard would have heard gunshots fired in the base of the quarry).
261. Id at 1080, 1090, 1101, 1183 (testimony of Lindert). See Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at
1120 (repeating that SS men stationed in the towers could see part of the quarry floor).
262. United States v. Altfuldisch, No. 000-50-5, 3402, 3509-10 (DJAWC, Dachau 13
May 1946).
263. See supra note 27 and discussion Part L.A (attributing a presumption of guilt to all
those who served in the SS Totenkopl).
264. Berenyi v. INS, 385 U.S. 630, 636 (1967) (affirming denaturalization based on failure
to expose past Communist Party membership).
265. In re Bespatow, 100 F. Supp. 44, 45 (W.D. Pa. 1951) (holding that the "good moral
character" standard reflects the values upheld by the alien's neighborhood).
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266
ing prisoners. In essence, the court refused to apply the Nairnberg principles and
the holdings of similar American cases that applied those principles. 67 The court
misinterpreted and misapplied Fedorenko and Petkiwtsch to Lindert's case, de-
clining to conclude that Lindert's service "irreparably soil[ed]" his moral charac-
ter.
6s
B. LINDERT'S FALSE TESTIMONY IN VISA AND NATURALZATION PAPERS
The second count of the Complaint charged that Lindert lacked good moral
character because he submitted false testimony on his visa and naturalization pa-
pers.269 The court resolved that the government failed to provide convincing evi-
dence with the requisite amount of certitude that any of the documents pertaining
to Lindert represented intentionally provided false testimony under INA §
1101(f)(6).'0
On the matter of visa issuance, the government alleged that Lindert answered a
question calling for "places of previous residence" with "1942-1945 German
Army," although he had resided at that time with the SS at two concentration
camps.271 As evidenced by numerous OSI cases, individuals who served as SS
guards commonly lied about this service or distorted it as "German Army" service
in order to gain admission to this country. 2 Applicants were not supposed to rec-
266. United States v. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. 1114, 1125 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
267. See, e.g., United States v. Schmidt, 923 F.2d 1253, 1259 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding
that Schmidt's service per se as a Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp guard, where he re-
strained prisoners and exposed them to "unspeakably brutal" working conditions, consti-
tuted "clear and convincing evidence that he assisted the Nazis in persecuti[on]"); United
States v. Hutyrczyk, 803 F. Supp. 1001, 1010 (D.N.L 1992) (finding it irrelevant whether a
perimeter guard had ever had occasion to stop anyone while on patrol); In re Kulle, 19 1. &
N. Dec. 318, 332 (B.I.A. 1985) (holding that service as a perimeter guard constituted assis-
tance in persecution because guards restrained prisoners within the confines of the camps).
The Hutyrczyk court claimed that "the effect of the presence of armed guards surely must
have persuaded prisoners not to attempt to leave their barracks ... ." Hutyrzyk, 803 F.
Supp. at 1010. Since the SS men who patrolled the perimeter of the camps guaranteed that
Jews did not escape, the court concluded that Hutyrczyk's duties as an armed guard alone
constituted assistance in persecution. IkL at 1012.
268. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1125.
269. Lindert Complaint, supra note 8, at 8. See INA § 1101(f)(6) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1101 (f)(6)) (establishing that false statements provided by an applicant indicate a lack of
good moral character).
270. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1126-27. Section 1101(f)(6) contains four elements. Spe-
cifically, the applicant's statement must be: 1) oral; 2) sworn; 3) made for the purpose of
obtaining immigration or naturalization benefits; and 4) false. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(0(6).
271. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1126; Lindert Complaint, supra note 8, at 5.
272. Eg., Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 496 (1981) (noting that the defen-
dant recorded concentration camp guard service as "German Army" service); United States
v. Schmidt, 923 F.2d 1253, 1256 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); Kulle v. INS, 825 F.2d 1188, 1195
(7th Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. Breyer, 829 F. Supp. 773, 776 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(same); United States v. Leprich, 666 F. Supp. 967, 970 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (same); United
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273ord Waffen SS service as German Army service. One court noted the motivation
behind an immigrant's misrepresenting wartime service.274 Moreover, the immi-
grant inspector who signed Lindert's visa testified that, when interviewing appli-
cants under oath, he made a detailed inquiry into the applicant's wartime serv-
275ice. It follows that, had Lindert honestly answered the inspector, the truth about
his wartime duties would have surfaced.
The court concluded, however, that the question regarding past activities and
affiliations did not require information about the applicant's activities at the places
of previous residence; therefore, the court held that Lindert answered honestly.
276
Moreover, the court conjectured that Lindert might have confused "army" with
"armed forces ' 277 or that the mistake occurred because of his poor English abili-
278ties. Such a determination by the court necessarily nullifies a finding that
Lindert intended to make a false statement for immigration or naturalization pur-
poses.279 The immigration officer who conducted the final interview and signed
Lindert's visa papers testified, however, that he would have responded to Lindert's
answer by questioning him about the precise details of his service. 280 The court ig-
States v. Kairys, 600 F. Supp. 1254, 1266 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (same); United States v. Schel-
long, 547 F. Supp. 569, 576 (N.D. II1. 1982) (same); United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F.
Supp. 1362, 1379 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (same).
273. Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 948-49, 951-52 (testimony of Jelinek).
274. Schellong, 547 F. Supp. at 576 ("Given the widely recognized consequences to an
immigrant who had been linked to the concentration camps, ... defendant had ample reasons to
hide his guard service.").
275. Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 936 (testimony of Jelinek). Jelinek was a former
Vice-Consul who issued visas during the period in question. Id.
In theory, the investigation should have covered a "neighborhood check," CIC security
files check, United States military government records check, and Berlin Document Center
check. McCarran Hearings, supra note 53, at 871.
276. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1127.
277. Id. The court disregarded former immigration official Greener's testimony that he
employed interpreters during the final interviews in order to avoid confusing those appli-
cants unfamiliar with the English language. Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 1003-05
(testimony of Greener).
278. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1126-27; supra note 277 and accompanying text.
279. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1127.
280. Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 1003-05, 1007-08 (testimony of Greener). Fur-
thermore, Greener testified that he would have rejected Lindert's application if Lindert had
revealed the truth of his service on the forms:
OSI: If going over question 26 when you asked an applicant where he had
served and in what capacity, as he stated, if he revealed that he was in the
Waffen SS Totenkopf, what, if anything, you would have done?
Greener: It would have been grounds for refusal.
THE COURT: If he would have said he was in the Waffen SS, would you have
inquired as to what he did while he was in the SS?
Greener: If he had said Waffen SS combat division, I would have asked him in
what capacity and where.
Id. at 1008. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 509-514 (1981) (approving the
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noted this testimony and failed to note it in its decision. Other courts have attrib-
uted knowledge of the difference between "German Army" service and "Death's
Head Battalion" service to the defendant, discounting the Lindert court's hold-
ing.
281
Realizing the high improbability of confusion between German Army service
and Death's Head Battalion service, other courts have discredited such testi-
mony. Moreover, Lindert himself knew that the officials had already rejected his
application on the basis of his Waffen SS service.3 Likewise, his response of
"1942-1945 with German Army" to the "residence" question indicates his clear
understanding that the question required information about military service.
Nevertheless, the Lindert court mentioned intent to perjure one's visa applica-
tion 84 and concluded that the government failed to show that Lindert was aware of
his statements' falsity. Hence, the court found that a man once rejected for in-
forming the United States government of his service in the Waffen SS later be-
lieved that he had served instead in the "German Army."
C. LINDERT'S MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS IN NATURALIZATION PAPERS
The government additionally charged Lindert with illegally F rocuring citizen-
ship by willfully concealing or misrepresenting material facts. The government
use of testimony by former immigration officials to explain statutory procedures for emi-
gration to the United States).
281. See United States v. Schellong, 717 F.2d 329, 334 (7th Cir. 1983) (upholding the dis-
trict court's finding that Schellong intentionally listed "German Army" service instead of con-
centration camp guard service on INS Form N-400); United States v. Schiffer, 831 F. Supp.
1166, 1200-01 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (believing that the defendant understood the negative conse-
quences of listing Death's Head service rather than mere "German Army" service); In re Kulle,
19 L &N. Dec. 318, 335 (B.IA. 1985) (same). Cf United States v. TittJung, 753 F. Supp. 251
(E.D. Wis. 1990) (listing "German Army" service rather than concentration camp guard serv-
ice on INS Form N-400); United States v. Schmidt, 923 F.2d 1253, 1256 (7th Cir. 1991)
(omitting concentration camp guard service from his immigration and naturalization applica-
tions).
282. Cf Schellong, 717 F.2d at 333 (holding that one's attempt to conceal concentration
camp guard service by listing Waffen SS duty but failing to mention Totenkopfduty consti-
tuted a material misrepresentation); Kulle, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 335 (calling misrepresentation
of military service in the Totenkopf Division of the Waffen SS as service in the German
Army materially fraudulent); see also Schmidt, 923 F.2d at 1256 (exemplifying deliberate
failure to reveal membership in the Totenkopj); United States v. Breyer, 829 F. Supp. 773,
776 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (same); United States v. Leprich, 666 F. Supp. 967, 968 (E.D. Mich.
1987) (illustrating purposeful concealment of Waffen SS service at Mauthausen).
283. United States v. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. 1114, 1121 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
284. Id at 1126-27.
285. Id
286. Id at 1127-28. As the court noted, the petitioner must willfully conceal or misrep-
resent material information before the court may revoke citizenship. Id at 1124. See
Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 767 (1988) (requiring willfulness); United States v.
Tittjung, 753 F. Supp. 251, 254 (E.D. Wis. 1990) (finding that willful or inadvertent con-
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287based its claim on Lindert's answer to Question 7 on his naturalization papers.
The government alleged that Lindert's omission of Waffen SS membership in his
answer represents a material misrepresentation of the facts.288
On the naturalization form, the government alleged that Question 7, calling for
all organizational memberships, required Lindert to reveal his Death's Head Bat-
talion membership prior to obtaining citizenship. 28 9 A former naturalization exam-
iner testified that standard operating procedure for naturalization applicants at the
relevant time required the defendant to list wartime service and answer questions
about it.290 Ignoring the government witness' testimony, the court found instead
that the question did not call for a statement of military service. 29' Stressing this
point, the court stated that the examiner failed to satisfy the court with sufficient
evidence that he would have asked Lindert about his military service.292 Though
the government's witnesses' testimony suggested a contrary finding,293 the court
determined that the naturalization forms had not squarely called for the informa-
cealment voids an entry visa).
287. United States v. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. 1114, 1127 (N.D. Ohio 1995). At the time of
Lindert's application, Question 7 asked every applicant to list "each organization, associa-
tion, foundation, club or society in the United States or in any other place that [he/she had]
been a member of at any time, and the dates and membership of each." Id.
288. See cases cited supra notes 281-82.
289. Lindert Record, supra note 58, at 670-75 (testimony of Siracusa). The following
exchange occurred at the trial:
OSI:Would membership by an applicant in the Death's Head Battalion at a
concentration camp have affected your decision about whether an applicant
should be naturalized?
Siracusa: Yes, it would have.... [M]embership in the Death's Head Battalion,
as we knew at that time, was a voluntary membership in an elite arn of the
German regime not connected with the army. And these type volunteers
were assigned for specific duty namely political activity or guards or per-




291. Lindert, 907F. Supp. at 1128.
292. Id. at 1127. Cf United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946, 947 (5th Cir. 1979)
(characterizing the failure to reveal concentration camp guard service as "a misrepresenta-
tion by nondisclosure"). In Lindert, the government's witness testified that standard operat-
ing procedure regarding Question 7 directed the naturalization examiner to question the
petitioner about past membership in a military organization. Lindert Record, supra note 58,
at 669, 721-22 (testimony of Siracusa). Cf. Sittler v. United States, 316 F.2d 312 (2d Cir.
1963) (acknowledging that naturalization officials in the early 1960s focused particularly
on organizational memberships and wartime activities). Since naturalization examiners at
the time of Lindert's petition were focusing on the wartime activities of petitioners, it fol-
lows that the information should have surfaced at some point prior to his naturalization.
293. See supra note 289.
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tion that Lindert failed to provide.294 Moreover, the court, citing an unspecified
"trail of paper records," found that the government had neglected to prove the will-
filness of the posited misrepresentation.295
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Lindert court failed to apply international precedent, domestic precedent
and evidence admitted at the trial supporting the government's claims. Had the
court applied the vast body of Ntlrnberg precedent and controlling cases, it would
have revoked Lindert's citizenship as a matter of law. The government declined to
appeal29 6 the decision, 297 however, and so the legacy of Lindert remains.29
294. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1128.
295. Id For a brief discussion of the willfulness requirement, see supra note 286.
296. The OSI did not appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Close examination of the recent history of cases brought by the OSI in the Sixth Circuit
suggets a possible rationale for the OSI's reticence in appealing. The first cases involve the
extradition proceedings of Ivan (John) Demjanjuk.
After the United States government extradited Demjanjuk to Israel to stand trial for war
crimes, the Sixth Circuit panel that heard Demjanjuk's pre-extradition appeal sua sponte
reopened the case to determine whether the OSI committed fraud on the court. A Special
Master appointed by the panel investigated and reported that the Government did not
commit fraud upon the court.
The panel, however, disregarded the Special Master's conclusions and found that the
OSI prosecutors did not purposely withhold information from the defense in Damjanjuk v.
Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 355 (6th Cir. 1993), but that they recklessly withheld information.
The panel, in essence, retroactively applied criminal discovery rules in these civil denatu-
ralization and extradition proceedings where such rules do not traditionally apply.
As a result, the panel vacated the extradition order for Demjanjuk, who, in the mean-
time, was acquitted by the Israeli Supreme Court. Ia The suspect nature of the Sixth Cir-
cuit's actions has not gone unnoticed. See Steven Lubet, That's Funny, You Don't Look
Like You Control the Government: The Sixth Circuit's Narrative on Jewish Power, 45
HAsTNGs L.J. 1527, 1529 (1994) (criticizing the grounds for the panel's vacating of the
extradition order); Brief for Jerrold Nadler, Holocaust Survivors in Pursuit of Justice, Inc.
and World Jewish Congress, Rison v. Demjanjuk, 115 S. Ct. 295 (1993) (No. 93-1875)
(denying certiorari) (proposing that the Sixth Circuit "contradicted" Supreme Court and
other circuit court precedent, employed "unusual legal procedures" and "incorporateld
stereotypes of Jews that have no place in a judicial decision and create potential adverse
consequences for the exercise of their right to communicate with the government").
In a separate case, Petkievytsch v. INS, 945 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1991), the Sixth Circuit
carefully distinguished Supreme Court precedent and held for the defendant. See discussion
supra Part III.A.2 (explaining how the Sixth Circuit ignored the plain language of the
Holtzman Amendment and ultimately held that the Amendment applies only to those whom
the government establishes actively and personally assisted in persecution).
In addition, the sentiments that exist in the Sixth Circuit towards cases involving defen-
dants who allegedly participated in Nazi-sponsored persecution are manifest in the follow-
ing excerpt. This excerpt from the oral argument held July 25, 1991, before Judges Merritt,
Lively and Hull illustrates the misunderstanding of the purpose of proceedings instituted by
OSI-4o denaturalize and deport former Nazi collaborators:
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Judge Merritt: [Discussing the differing degrees of hardship imposed at differ-
ent Nazi camps.] It seems to me that we've got a matter of degree here, that
there really is a difference somewhere along the line.
OSI:Your Honor, all the 7th Circuit cases, I beg to differ, but if you look at
them they make a very important point, that it does not matter if you are at
the most infamous concentration camp, you could be at a labor camp, at
Sachsenhausen, at the labor portion of Treblinka, at -
Judge Lively:- anymore than the average stay was 56 days and the charges
were things as insignificant as forgetting to wear a badge.
Judge Merritt:I guess we could take this all afternoon and we'd better bring it
to a close. I think that we understand your argument and think this attitude
of, the notion that the Holocaust should be kept alive, but there's a differ-
ence between keeping the Holocaust alive and between culpable individuals
and this involuntariness thing. We are going to have to take a good hard
look at this.
Oral argument at the Sixth Circuit, July 25, 1991, before Judges, Merritt, Lively and Hull
(emphasis added). The "badge" referred to was a yellow star or triangle which signified that
the prisoner was Jewish, the basis for the prisoner's incarceration. Lindert Record, supra
note 58, at 160-61 (testimony of Sydnor) (describing the six different triangular patches and
their corresponding meanings, which were taught to all guards); id. at 630-31 (testimony of
Vidmar) (testifying that all prisoners wore patches). The persecuted did not "forget" to wear
their badges, but rather attempted to elude detection by not wearing them. But see id. at
1174 (testimony of Lindert) (testifying that he never saw "marks" signifying different
"crimes" on the prisoners).
The suggestion that the Justice Department is merely trying to keep the Holocaust
"alive" minimizes the criminality carried out during the Second World War and strengthens
the questionable rhetoric used by the Sixth Circuit in Demjanjuk. In that case, the court as-
serted: "'It is obvious ... that the prevailing mindset at "a division of the United States Jus-
tice Department" was that the office must try to please and maintain very close relationships
with various "Jewish" interest groups because their continued existence depended upon it."'
Lubet, supra, at 1527 (quoting Demjanjuk, 10 F.3d at 355). This statement feeds anti-
Jewish sentiment, because, as judicial ethics expert Lubet noted, the court's "point is merely
that Jewish groups were able to dictate the 'mindset' of certain federal prosecutors." Id. at
1528. This assertion "ultimately rested on the notion that Jews are able, through stealth or
pressure, to exert unjustified sway over governmental bodies." Id. The court used the
above-cited rationale to justify its order vacating the extradition of John Demjanjuk after an
Israeli tribunal acquitted him. Demjanjuk, 10 F.3d at 342. Lubet argues that the Sixth Cir-
cuit embellished the facts "in a way that demonstrates, at the very least, an unconscious re-
ceptiveness to age-old images of clandestine Jewish influence and control." Lubet, supra, at
1535.
Nonetheless, the foundation of denaturalization cases of participants in Nazi-sponsored
persecution rests on the "nature of the acts they committed: acts that the laws of all civi-
lized nations define as criminal." Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th
Cir. 1992). Cf RYAN, supra note 41, at 251 (asserting that as the Director of OSI, he en-
deavored to keep the OSI's trials from becoming "public debates on the evils of the Holo-
caust"). Ryan rationalized as follows: "Trials are intended to elicit facts so that judgments--
sometimes profound judgments, as in these cases--can be rendered. Only if the trials have
integrity as trials can they serve any purpose afterward in illuminating the social or histori-
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cal issues that give rise to them." Id at 251-52.
297. There are particular problems with appeal of each count in Lindert v. United States.
Lindert's three years of service as a Mauthausen camp guard, however, must defeat the good
moral character necessary for naturalization. Nevertheless, in comparison to other courts' de-
teminations regarding the element of good moral character, Lindet consists of the least com-
pelling fact pattern. See, e.g., United States v. Schiffer, 831 F. Supp. 1166, 1199 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (denaturalizing an armed camp guard whose service was voluntary and who guarded
prisoners going to and from work sites and on "death marches" for lacking good moral charac-
ter), aft4, 31 F.3d 1175 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Theodorovich, 102 F.RD. 587, 591
(D.D.C. 1984) (finding absence of good moral character where defendant was a member of the
Nazi-affiliated Ukrainian police, which shot Jewish civilians), aft'd, 764 F.2d 926 (D.C. Cir.
1985); United States v. Koziy, 540 F. Supp. 25, 35 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (holding that employment
as a Ukrainian police officerper se and participation in the murder of civilians both independ-
ently preclude a finding of good moral character), aff'd, 728 F.2d 1314, 1317, 1321-22 (1 th
Cir. 1984); United States v. Osidach, 513 F. Supp. 51, 103 n.31 (E.D. Pa. 1931) (interpreting
and patrolling the streets for the Nazi-affiliated Ukrainian police and identifying Jews among
the populace for future arrest signifies lack of good moral character); United States v. Linnas,
527 F. Supp. 426, 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (concluding Linnas lacked good moral character by
virtue of his service as the head of an Estonian concentration camp and his shooting of Jewish
civilians), aftd, 685 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1982).
Precedent exists that both agrees with and repudiates the Lindert court's perspective on
what information the visa and naturalization forms demanded. Compare Kungys v. United
States, 485 U.S. 759, 779-80 (1988) (reading § 1101(f)(6) literally and holding that even the
"most immaterial of lies with the intent of obtaining immigration benefits7 characterizes bad
moral character) and United States v. Schellong, 717 F.2d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting
that Schellong understood that the visa and naturalization forms required disclosure of wartime
activities), affd, 718 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1983) with United States v. Kaiys, 600 F. Supp.
1254, 1267 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (dismissing the government's contention that the visa and naturali-
zation forms required the applicant to reveal wartime service), affid, 782 F.2d 1374 (7th Cir.
1986).
Concomitantly, the manner in which the Lindert court drafted its opinion also presents
challenging aspects for an appeal. The court's factual findings concerning the information
Lindert provided on his immigration and naturalization forms, the second element, negate the
element of "intent to lie to obtain immigration or naturalization." The court accepted Lindert's
assertion that all of his post-war accounts of wartime service resulted from incompetent clerks
taking information from previous forms without verifying their contents, despite contrary evi-
dence showing the unlikelihood of such a claim. Similarly, the court failed to mention the third
element, swor oral testimony.
As with the false testimony count, there are cases supporting and rejecting the Lindert
court's view of precisely what information the naturalization forms demanded as to the count
of material misrepresentation. Even if the circuit court agreed with the government's view that
Lindert did make a false statement, the district court's factual findings would make it difficult
to show, as with the false testimony count, that Lindert had in fact intended to lie.
Furthermore, the Lindert opinion fails to cite any evidence that the government did provide.
Not one reference to witnesses or exhibits presented by the government appears in the opinion.
Alternatively, the court mentions substantial details of defendant's testimony. As the court
couched the majority of the opinion in terms of credibility determinations and evaluations of
evidence, Lindert, 907 F. Supp. at 1118, 1119, 1120, 1125 (attributing credibility to Lindert's
testimony), it is traditionally very difficult to overturn such a decision. See Anderson v. Bes-
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As prescribed by international law, the United States Congress, and other Fed-
299eral Courts of Appeals, the Sixth Circuit should interpret Fedorenko and the
Holtzman Amendment differently. 300 A finding that service as a concentration
camp guard at one of the most notorious death camps does not nullify an individ-
30 1ual's good moral character contradicts case precedent in the United States. The
policy and principles underlying the country's foundation mandate the develop-
ment of a single, uniform body of case law affirming the revocation of naturaliza-
tion orders of former concentration camp guards who served in the SS Totenkopf
Present conditions mandate that the United States judicial system commit to
excluding participants in Nazi-sponsored persecution through denaturalization and
deportation proceedings. First, the OSI has additional cases pending, filed and un-
der investigation than it ever did since its creation sixteen years ago.30 2 Second, the
collapse of the Soviet Union has created a multitude of small, ethnically divided
republics. Many of these republics suffered tremendously from the Nazi regime's
303persecution. It remains questionable, however, whether these fledgling republics
will develop the legal systems and corresponding expertise to accommodate or
304commit to trying individuals who collaborated in the Nazi program. The emer-
semer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (asserting that appellate courts defer to the initial trier of
facts regarding factual findings).
298. As most of the OSI's cases do not involve Nazi persecutors who immigrated under
the RRA, the ramifications of this decision for pending and future OSI cases will not be
calamitous.
299. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of inter-
national law to United States law).
300. See discussion supra Part III.A.I.
301. See discussion supra Part III.A.1 and note 296.
302. GERMAN LAW, supra note 37, pt. 6, § 1, at 3 (noting the "dramatic Increase" that the
OSI has experienced in its pending caseload because of the "recent dissolution of commu-
nist rule in eastern and central Europe" which allowed the OSI's staff to access archives that
the communist governments had removed from the public domain).
303. See DAWlDOWICZ, supra note 142, at 397-98 (documenting how Nazi atrocities
cruelly affected Russia, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine); David Friedman,
Nowhere to Run, NEWSDAY, Feb. 23, 1995, at B4 (citing Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and
Ukraine as the locations of "some of the most notorious Nazi atrocities"). The combined
Jewish population of the Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia was roughly
253,000 before the arrival of the Germans. DAwIDowicz, supra note 142, at 399-400. The
Nazis massacred approximately 90% of the Baltic Jewish population, 66% of Belarus' pre-
occupation Jewish population, and 60% of the Ukraine's Jewish populations. Id. at 401.
The Jewish population in Russia managed a much higher survival rate of approximately
90%. Id.
304. See, e.g., David Talbot, Victims of Vilnius - Lithuania, BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 13,
1995, at 4 (remarking that Lithuania is becoming a Nazi-harboring "Paraguay of Europe"
and the country is reluctant to prosecute alleged Nazi persecutors); Jay L. Chavkin, Note
and Comment, Man Without a Country: The Just Desserts of John Demjanjuk, 28 LoY.
L.A. L. REv. 769, 789-90 (1995) (stating that the former Soviet republics lack the
"wherewithal and legal infrastructure necessary to effect justice" for past Nazi war crimes);
Efraim Zuroff, Nazi Untouchables, JERUsALEM POST, Apr. 8, 1993, at Opinion (asserting
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gence of ultranationalist and anti-Semitic sentiment in Russia will hamper such
travails in that country?"5
More notably, however, the United States needs to send a positive message be-
cause similar atrocities are occurring in Eastern Europe305 and Africa2? 0 Specifi-
that Nazi collaborators are recognized as heroes in former Soviet republics). The OSI re-
cently succeeded in denaturalizing Aleksandras Lileikis, a Lithuanian by birth and alleged
Chief of the Lithuanian Security Police, an organization notorious for its persecutory con-
duct. United States v. Lileikis, 929 F. Supp. 31 (D. Mass. 1996). The government of
Lithuania, however, declines to mete out justice for Lileikis' past persecutory conduct.
Lithuanian Accused of Delaying Case of Suspected War Criminal, BRmSH BROADCSnNG
CORP., June 24, 1996 (suggesting that the Lithuanian government is purposely avoiding the
prosecution of Lileikis); Talbot, supra (suggesting the same).
305. See, e.g., It's Alive, ECONOMIST, Dec. 16, 1995, at 13 (reporting that voters in Rus-
sia cast 23% of their votes, a plurality, in December 1993 for Vladimir V. Zhirinovsky's
Liberal Democratic Party which churned out ultranationalist propaganda); Vladimir Kli-
menko & Cynthia Scharf, Zhirinovsky 's Success Draws Disturbing Parallels to Hitler: West
May Be Handing Russia to a Teleganic Fascist by Making Country Pay for Cold War,
CimsiAN ScL MoNrroR, Jan. 10, 1994, at 22 (comparing the current resurgence of ul-
tranationalist ideology in Russia to the Nazi ideology of Hitler's Germany); Justin Burke,
Germans Look to U.S. for Help in Halting Race-Related Attacks, CHRITIAN SCL MONrrOR,
Mar. 2, 1994, at 4 (noting the emerging link between Russian ultranationalist and German
neo-Nazi ideologies).
306. See, e.g., Morton I. Abramowitz, Refugees: The Dilemma of Global Dislocation,
Address to the Fourth Annual Franklin and Eleanor Distinguished Lecture, Roosevelt Uni-
versity (Nov. 21, 1995), in 62 VrrAL SPEECHEs 138 (Dec. 15, 1995) (relating that ethnic
cleansing in the former Yugoslavia has "displaced or made refugees" of at least two million
"minorities"); Nicole M. Procinda, Note, Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia-Hercegovina. A Case
Study: Employing United Nation Mechanisms to Enforce the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L LJ. 655, 690 (1995)
(discussing the genocide that has taken place in the former Yugoslavia and steps taken to
deal with the aftermath); Scott Peterson, Justice for Bosnia May Rest in Mixed Memories:
War Crimes Trials Jeopardized by Discrepancies in Witness' Accounts, CHRISTIAN Sci.
MoNrroR, May 10, 1996, at I (recounting the "ethnic cleansing" that took place in Brcko,
Yugoslavia in 1992 and the problems associated with bringing the accountable individuals
to justice). A resurgence of Nazi and fascist ideologies has resurfaced throughout Europe.
See also Stephen Kinzer, Youths Adrift in a New Germany Turn to Neo-Nais, N.Y. TI.ES,
Sept. 28, 1992, at A3 (recounting that neo-Nazi ideas have become prevalent among
youths); Stephen Kinzer, German Unrest Expected to Bring Tightening of Law on Immi-
gration, N.Y. TImS, Sept. 2, 1992, at Al (reporting that because German youths have been
attacking immigrants, the German government has restricted immigration for those seeking
asylum and foreign workers); William Tuohy, Waldheim Wins Vote in Austria: Elected
President Amid Charges of Role in War Crimes, L.A. T.Es, June 9, 19S6, at A7 (reporting
that Austrians elected a Nazi officer to be their president). For the history behind the inves-
tigation disclosing Waldheim's past, see EU M. ROSENBAU , BM1RAYAL (1993).
307. See, e.g., Abramowitz, supra note 306 (mentioning the genocide in Rwanda and the
nearly billion dollar expense to pay for the "protection of refugees and rehabilitation
costs"); Linda Maguire, Power Ethnicized the Pursuit of Protection and Participation in
Rwanda andBurundi, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 49, 64 (1995) (highlighting the "ethnic cleansing"
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cally, the precedent of prosecutions of those who collaborated in Nazi-sponsored
persecution will take on increasing importance with the recent peace accord be-
tween the Serbians, Muslims and Croats.308 Since some refugees from war-torn
countries will inevitably seek immigration benefits in the United States, 3° the
United States' judiciary must reinforce America's exclusion of war criminals and
individuals who participated in persecutory conduct. The credibility of the United
States' asserted refusal to become a destination for those who persecute and defile
the human rights of others mandates the nation's respect for the Ntmberg princi-
ples. If our courtrooms ignore or reject Ntlrnberg's fundamental international legal
doctrines, then Ntlmberg and its progeny become meaningless.
V. CONCLUSION
The Northern District of Ohio's decision in United States v. Lindert represents a
and "genocide" that has plagued Rwanda and Burundi since their independence); Will
Lynch, How Can We Ignore the Cries of Children? Africa: 'Ethnic Cleansing' Escalates;
The U.N. Must Act, L.A. TMES, Aug. 8, 1996, at B9 (urging action by the United Nations in
response to the rampant genocide and "ethnic cleansing" taking place in Rwanda, Burundi
and Zaire).
308. Dayton Agreement for Peace, signed by Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia, Dec. 14, 1995.
See Craig R. Whitney, Balkan Accord: The Overview; Balkan Foes Sign Peace Pact Divid-
ing an Unpacified Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1995, at AI (printing the Agreement). The
Agreement establishes a war crimes tribunal, id., similar to the IMT.
309. But see Abramowitz, supra note 306 (stating that the United States has accepted
few refugees in "imminent danger from war or persecution" in recent years and predicting
that a large influx over the next decade is unlikely).
310. See Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, I AN INsIDER'S GUmE TO Trm INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 9, 91, 111 (1995) (contending
that the legacy of individual criminal accountability represents one of Ntmberg's monu-
mental legacies and presenting Article 7, Individual Criminal Responsibility, of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and generally illustrating how the
Ntlrnberg Trial and the IMTs established the precedent for present day war crimes tribu-
nals); see generally Matthew Lippman, The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide: Forty-five Years Later, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1
(1994) (submitting that the Ntlmberg principles formed the foundation for the United Na-
tion's Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide). South Af-
rican jurist Richard Goldstone, acknowledged the world's failure to learn a simple, but cru-
cial message exemplified by Ntlmberg:
The day amnesties for war crimes are given is the first day of the next cycle
of violence. There are too many victims who want some acknowledgement.
There are too many victims who want some form of justice. If their voices are
ignored, the spirals of violence in those areas will continue.
The International Tribunals have to be an example, a shining light to all
nations.
Richard Goldstone, War Crimes Atrocity Victims in Bosnia Cry Out for Justice, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Dec. 17, 1995, at G-1 (emphasis added). Justice Goldstone currently serves as
chief prosecutor for the United Nations' International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Id.
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major break from international and domestic precedent. The holding represents the
judicial branch's difficult and frustrating task of enforcing justice fifty years after
criminal activity took place. Nevertheless, time does not mitigate the effect of the
"crimes against humanity" in which Lindert participated by virtue of his duties of
service in the Totenkopf. The court should not have concluded that Lindert's role
in preventing malnourished and mistreated prisoners from escaping their intern-
ment had no bearing on his character and hence his fitness for the privilege of
United States citizenship."'
The international community views OSI as the "most aggressive and effective
Nazi-hunting operation."312 It has built up this reputation by bringing cases
against, inter alia, former concentration camp guards. The justice system of the
United States "will lack basic moral integrity and justice unless accounts are prop-
erly and fully settled with remaining Nazi [collaborators]. 313 Courts should find
that anyone who served as a former concentration camp guard lacks good moral
character and does not merit the privilege of United States citizenship or residence.
Hopefully, the Lindert decision will not affect other cases within and outside
the Sixth Circuit. Although over half a century has passed since the Allied Powers
liberated the concentration camps, new evidence against participants in Nazi-
sponsored persecution has emerged from newly gained access to the archives after
the recent fall of the Eastern Bloc countries.3 14 As the number of cases brought by
the United States government proliferates, it becomes increasingly important that
American courts recognize that the duties required by certain service within Nazi
and Nazi-sponsored organizations negates a finding of good moral character.
311. See Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 836 (1971) (holding that an alien enjoys no consti-
tutional right to United States citizenship); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276,290 (1966) (same).
312. Rick Atkinson, As Time Slips Away So Do Aging Nazis, Commercial Appeal
(Memphis, TN), Sept. 3, 1995, at A19 (explaining that OSI has met with limited success in its
endeavors). Atkinson quotes one Justice Department official as having estimated that 10,000
Nazi persecutors may have immigrated to the United States between 1948 and 1952. Id
313. ROSENBAUM, supra note 128, at 87.
314. Carole Landry, Hunting Down Nazis with Some Help from tie KGB Files, AGENCE
FRANcE-PRnsm, July 15, 1995 (quoting OSI Director Eli Rosenbaum as saying that the fall
of the Iron Curtain has provided access to many previously inaccessible archives). For ex-
ample, the United States instituted denaturalization proceedings against seven alleged Nazi
collaborators in 1994 for affirmatively misrepresenting their wartime activities to immigra-
tion officials. GnAmN LAW, supra note 37, pt. 6, § I, at 3. That number represents the high-
est single-year total in over ten years, id, and exceeds the number instituted by Australia,
Britain, Canada and Scotland combined for the same period. Landry, supra. See Michael
Dobbs, Decoded Cables Revise History of Holocaust, VASH. POsT., Nov. 10, 1996, at Al
(reporting about newly declassified and released information revealing that ordinary Ger-
man police and army units participated in Nazi-sponsored executions).
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